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Local base Search and Rescue (SAR) units were established to provide support for 
military operations. Civilian communities have also benefited, often utilizing the Marine 
Corps’ SAR capabilities to support local requests. However, SAR is not a core 
competency of the Marine Corps or a function of Marine aviation.   
The current fiscal climate demands that the Marine Corps seek ways to achieve 
cost savings while maintaining its core competencies.  The divestiture of functions that 
do not support the Corps’ execution of its Title 10 responsibilities is a possible solution.  
Local base SAR units bear significant operations and support costs.  Moreover, the 
Marine Corps faces additional modernization costs due to the age of its SAR aircraft. At 
the same time the commercial helicopter industry has increased its ability to provide 
capable SAR services around the globe.    
Our research provides a current analysis of SAR costs to the Marine Corps and 
presents a cost projection for a 10-year time horizon. The research also conducts an 
analysis of outsourcing; the main findings of our analysis show that the Marine Corps can 
achieve annual savings of approximately $14 million (fiscal year 2014) through the use 
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Search and rescue: “The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and 
specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed 
persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment. Also called SAR” 
(“Search and Rescue,” 2010, p.241).  
A. INTRODUCTION  
SAR operations provide enormous value to both military and civilian agencies, 
yet these services come with significant costs. To obtain the most efficient use of Marine 
Corps (USMC) resources in an environment where cost savings have become 
increasingly important, while maintaining a commitment to support hazardous training 
operations requires a thorough analysis of current and alternative SAR methods. 
The value of local base SAR operations to the USMC stems from the number of 
lives saved due to decreased exposure time to hazardous conditions and ability of SAR 
personnel to administer medical attention to wounded persons. Additionally, local base 
SAR units have added value to the overall National SAR Plan, providing support to local 
civilian municipalities. As a result, lives of both uniformed service members and civilians 
have been saved. These actions have enabled the retention of knowledge and skill within 
the Marine Corps and have generated goodwill within the communities where Marines 
serve. The value of SAR operations is illustrated by the following examples.  
On March 29, 2011, a Marine CH-53D helicopter carrying four aircrew from 
HMH-363 took off from Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay on a training mission. Within 
four minutes of takeoff, the aircrew experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure. 
Unable to return to shore, the pilot-in-command made a mayday call. Seconds later, the 
CH-53D crashed into a sand bar in shallow water about a mile off shore. The crash killed 
one Marine and injured three others. The recovery effort consisted of rescue aircraft from 
the Coast Guard and the Honolulu Fire Department, which combined efforts to recover 
and transport the aircrew to emergency vehicles located nearby (Kakesako & Shikina, 
2011). As a result of the quick response from local rescue crews, the lives of three 
Marines were saved.  
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Equally impressive was the emergency transport of a civilian by Marine Corps 
SAR assets two years later. On July 14, 2013, a woman experienced a cardiac arrest 
while aboard the cruise ship Norwegian Gem off the coast of Morehead City, NC. Cruise 
ship personnel requested immediate assistance to transport the patient back to shore and 
enable her to receive medical attention. Within minutes, locally based search and rescue 
(SAR) Marines from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point responded in the 
HH-46E “Pedro” helicopter. Using a hoist and litter, rescue personnel recovered the 
patient and her husband, and flew them to the Carolina East Medical Center, where she 
received medical attention (Roberts, 2013, p. A3). This is one of numerous examples of 
military support to the National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States (hereafter 
National SAR Plan, 2007; United States Coast Guard [USCG], 2007) that demonstrates 
how effective interagency cooperation can enable the preservation of life. Both the rescue 
of the woman on the cruise ship and the rescue of the Marine helicopter crew illustrate 
the value of SAR operations. Additionally, these cases bring attention to the fact that 
while search and rescue operations take place under difficult circumstances SAR 
responses often involve multiple agencies coordinating available assets to accomplish the 
task of saving lives.  
This thesis seeks to determine a more efficient way for the Marine Corps to carry 
out SAR operations. To this end, we employ several cost estimating techniques such as 
learning curve theory, forecasting, and analogous methods based on historical data to 
derive the expected future costs of possible alternatives which are then normalized. 
Finally, we present a comparison of these alternatives and answer our research questions 
regarding the most cost-effective means.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of the National SAR Plan of the United States is to establish “the 
effective use of all available resources in all types of civil SAR missions to enable the 
United States to satisfy its humanitarian and national and international legal obligations” 
(USCG, 2007, p. 1). The National SAR Plan (USCG, 2007) establishes the framework 
and sets “the policy … for coordinating search and rescue services to meet domestic 
needs” (p. 1). The Department of Defense (DoD) is a participant of and signatory on the 
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National SAR Plan, along with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and 
various other government entities. These agencies work in concert to achieve greater 
efficiency and meet the nations’ domestic SAR needs.  
Under the plan, the DHS has the primary obligation of carrying out 
“responsibilities to protect against and respond to hazards and distress situations affecting 
the nation and its people” (USCG, 2007, p. 4). The DHS has two resources that enable it to 
accomplish this task: the Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). The Coast Guard is the primary means by which the department “establishes, 
maintains and operates civil SAR resources for the promotion of safety on, under and over 
international waters and waters subject to United States jurisdiction” (USCG, 2007, p. 4). 
Furthermore, the Coast Guard serves as the SAR coordinator for the maritime environment 
of the United States (USCG, 2007, p. 7). FEMA, on the other hand, is tasked with 
coordinating the response between government agencies and conducting the oversight 
responsibilities of the interagency system and its ability to respond to SAR events. As such, 
the DHS serves as the cornerstone of the nations’ SAR network. 
In order to meet its obligation to provide national defense, the DoD maintains 
tremendous capabilities and resources. The National SAR Plan (USCG, 2007) leverages 
DoD capabilities to maximize the efficiency of government resources in support of its 
objectives. However, the plan recognizes the paramount nature of the DoD’s mission to 
maintain national security by stating that DoD “resources may be used for civil SAR 
needs to the fullest extent practicable on a non-interference basis with primary military 
duties” (USCG, 2007, p. 4). One caveat to this overarching guidance is that the United 
States Air Force “provides and uses resources for the efficient organization and 
coordination of civil SAR operations, within its assigned SRR [search and rescue 
region]” (USCG, 2007, p. 5).  Moreover, the Air Force serves as the SAR coordinator for 
the continental United States (USCG, 2007, p. 7). To meet its obligations, the Air Force 
relies on its organic assets to provide specialized SAR capability and extensive use of the 
civil air patrol (CAP) to cover large geographic regions in the fulfillment of its mission 
(National Search and Rescue Committee, 2000, p. 2–6).    
As SAR coordinators, both the Coast Guard and the Air Force have “overall 
responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a U.S. SRR” 
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(National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007, p. 1–4). SAR coordinators are also 
responsible for establishing Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) to support SAR 
missions as required (USCG, 2007, p. 6). Military operations are specifically not included 
under the National SAR Plan, but each service is still responsible to provide its own SAR 
for military operations (USCG, 2007, p. 11). Non-military participants, like state and 
local police and fire departments, are mandated to cooperate with RCC requests, mutually 
support other search and rescue regions (SRRs), and pool resources to support SAR 
missions as requested (USCG, 2007, p. 12). The responsibility of responding to 
emergencies over such large distances across many diverse environments is a challenging 
task. As a result, the helicopter has become the primary mode of execution for many SAR 
missions, due to its speed and ability to access remote locations relatively quickly. 
The Marine Corps has historically retained its own local base SAR to support its 
high-risk training. However, due to the service’s relatively low demand for SAR, to the 
increasing costs associated with maintaining dedicated SAR assets, and to the 
increasingly redundant capabilities associated with the availability of adjacent federal 
government agencies and local municipalities, the Marine Corps has sought ways to 
divest its organic SAR capabilities in ways that will achieve financial savings while 
allowing it to maintain its commitment to service members and local communities. As a 
result, the Marine Corps has deactivated three local base SAR units since 1998. The SAR 
unit at MCAS Miramar was deactivated in 1998; SAR service there is now provided by 
the Coast Guard, Navy, and San Diego County Sheriff. The SAR unit located at MCAS 
Iwakuni was deactivated in 2002. According to message traffic from Headquarters 
Marine Corps, dated August 27, 2001, local base SAR at Iwakuni was deactivated due to 
the availability of redundant host nation capabilities. MCAS Beaufort followed in 2005, 
shifting SAR service responsibilities to nearby Coast Guard stations at Charleston and 
Savannah (Thompson, 2013). In all three instances, other government assets were 
deemed capable of accomplishing the SAR mission with minor degradations to service, 
which were accepted in lieu of low demand for SAR, and the exorbitant operations and 
support (O&S) and modernization (or procurement) costs associated with maintaining the 
local base SAR units. 
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Although the number of Marine Corps SAR assets has decreased over the past 
two decades, there has been a large increase in the number and capability of other 
government SAR assets and of commercial helicopter service providers. Today, 
competitors in the global helicopter industry like Cougar and Petroleum Helicopters 
Incorporated (PHi) provide SAR services to state and national parks, ocean-based gas and 
oil platforms, and local municipalities (Pedrick and Keenan, 2003, pp 2-3). Because 
private companies can often provide these services at a lower cost than the Marine Corps, 
a shift may be possible that will enable the Marine Corps to reduce its costs and 
reallocate manpower while maintaining its commitment to rescue downed aircrew and 
injured Marines in remote locations.  In its submission to the House of Commons Finance 
Committee in 2011, CHC posited the following: 
As a general rule, outsourced SAR services are delivered with a more 
efficient manpower model offering significant savings to the government. 
As an example, Ireland’s helicopter SAR service, which consists of four 
helicopter bases, has a total of 110 staff. This team provides robust, 24-
hour coverage for the country. (Nagel, 2011, p. 4) 
C. MARINE CORPS SEARCH AND RESCUE UNITS 
Cherry Point and Yuma are the only two Marine Corps Air Stations that continue to 
maintain local base SAR units. These units are unique in that they do not support combat 
missions or Marine Corps deployment operations but are entirely dedicated to the SAR 
mission at their respective installations. As a result, these units have been designed to meet 
this specific purpose. The units’ aircraft have been modified to meet SAR requirements in 
accordance with Naval Operations Instruction 3710.7U (Department of the Navy [DON], 
2009) and aircrew training has been altered to reflect its unique assignment. 
MCAS Cherry Point was commissioned in 1942, and today encompasses 29,000 
acres on the North Carolina coast. The air station is home to the 2nd Marine Aircraft 
Wing, which includes thousands of Marines, sailors, and civilian personnel and various 
tactical aircraft, including the AV-8B Harrier, the KC-130 Hercules, and the EA-6B 
Prowler (Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, 2013a). It is also home to Marine 
Transport Squadron 1 (VMR-1). Flying Pedro, the HH-46E SAR helicopter, VMR-1 
“provides Search and Rescue support to MCAS Cherry Point based aircraft” (Marine 
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Corps Air Station Cherry Point, 2013b). The HH-46E is based on the CH-46E Sea Knight 
airframe. Table 1 provides some of the basic performance characteristics of the CH-46E 
aircraft. Figure 1 shows VMR-1 conducting rescue training in the event that an over-
water rescue is required. 
Table 1.   CH-46E Performance Capabilities (“CH-46 Helicopter,” 2013) 
CH-46E “Sea Knight” 
Function Assault Support 
Prime Contractor Boeing 
Crew 4 
Speed Maximum 145 knots 
Range 365 nautical miles 
Useful Load 8,763 lbs / 15 litters 
 
  
Figure 1.  Photograph of VMR-1 Conducting Training Mission With HH-46E 
(after Colon, 2013)  
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According to the unit’s table of organization (T/O), the unit is composed of as 
many as 190 Marines and maintains a 24-hour SAR capability while also supporting the 
mission of the UC-35B and C-9B operational support aircraft (OSA) (Marine Transport 
Squadron One, 2013). The majority of aircrew within the squadron is qualified to fly on 
both SAR and OSA aircraft. Maintenance Marines are also dual-qualified to work on the 
HH-46E and the C9B; however, maintenance for the UC-35B is accomplished by means 
of a commercial contract with M7 Aerospace, LP (A. Smith, personal communication, 
July 16, 2013). See Appendix C for the unit T/O.  
The SAR capability at MCAS Cherry Point currently provides local commanders 
with the ability to reduce the response time of SAR to USMC assets operating in the 
tactical training areas surrounding Cherry Point. The Coast Guard maintains HH-60 
helicopters at Elizabeth City, NC, and HH-65 helicopters at Charleston, SC; however, the 
increased distance of each location to Marine Corps training areas results in a significant 
response delay and reduced on-station time. Because of this and the potential exposure 
risk to aircrew associated with cold Atlantic Ocean water temperatures, local base SAR at 
MCAS Cherry Point has been retained (HQMC, 1994, p.1). Helicopters from Elizabeth 
City require approximately 45 minutes more to transit to areas in the W-122 when 
compared to helicopters based at MCAS Cherry Point. Figure 2 on the following page 
depicts the distances of these local SAR assets to Marine Corps aviation training areas 
located adjacent to MCAS Cherry Point.    
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Figure 2.  Map of Cherry Point Training Areas and Distances from SAR Assets 
Located near the geographic junction of Arizona, California, and Mexico, MCAS 
Yuma began as Fly Field in 1928 and was used sparingly for training until 1941 when it 
was formally developed as a training air field for WWII pilots. After being shut down for 
a brief period in the 1950s, it was re-opened and designated a Marine Corps Air Station 
in 1962. Today, it shares its large runway with Yuma International Airport and supports 
some of the Marine Corps’ best training areas, along with thousands of square miles of 
adjacent airspace used by Marine aviation for advanced, tactical training. The air station 
is currently home to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), 
Marine Aircraft Group-13 (composed of multiple AV-8B Harrier squadrons), Marine 
Wing Support Squadron-371, and Marine Air Control Squadron One. The MCAS Yuma 
SAR unit (SRU), organized under Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron (H&HS), 
operates the HH-1N helicopter, with the “primary mission … to provide support for 
military flight operations within a 100 nautical mile radius of MCAS Yuma” (Marine 
Corps Air Station Yuma, 2013). Table 2 provides some of the basic performance 
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characteristics of the UH-1N. Figure 3 shows the SRU conducting SAR training in 
Yuma, AZ, utilizing the HH-1N’s hoist capability. 




Prime Contractor Bell Helicopter 
Crew 4 
Speed Maximum 130 knots 
Range 286 nautical miles 
Useful Load 3,500 lbs / 2 litters 
 
 
Figure 3.  Photo of H&HS Conducting Training with HH-1N (after Fry, 2010) 
According to the T/O, the Yuma SRU is composed of up to 48 Marines (MCAS 
Yuma, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron (H&HS), 2013). Many of the aircrew 
within the H&HS are qualified to fly on both SAR and OSA aircraft. However, Marines 
perform maintenance on the HH-1N only; maintenance for the C-12F (OSA aircraft) is 
accomplished by a commercial contract with Raytheon (C. Danford, personal 
communication, July 19, 2013). See the appendix C for the unit T/O. 
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The SRU at MCAS Yuma has also been retained due to the lack of other nearby 
SAR assets (HQMC, 1994, p.1). The San Diego Coast Guard Station and the Air Force 
55th Rescue Squadron (RQS) located at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), which both operate 
the HH-60 helicopter, and the air ambulance from Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
Center, located at Twentynine Palms, CA, all require approximately an additional hour of 
transit time compared to helicopters based at MCAS Yuma.  Figure 4 depicts the 
distances of each SAR unit to Yuma.  
 
Figure 4.  Map of Yuma Training Areas and Distances From SAR Assets 
D. MARINE CORPS SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITY 
Data on operations from both SAR units were captured via the Marine Sierra 
Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP).  “M-SHARP is Marine Aviation's web-
based application for scheduling, training management, operational risk management, and 
reporting of training readiness” (Innova Systems International, 2013). Our research used 
flight mission data from M-SHARP to obtain historical flight information of the HH-1N 
and HH-46E helicopters by fiscal year beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2008. Because M-
SHARP fielding was ongoing throughout the Marine Corps during FY2008, no flight 
mission data were available for either airframe prior to that time. Data for each fiscal year 
were downloaded into Microsoft Excel and parsed by unit, airframe, date, flight times, 
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mission type, aircrew, flight hours, launch and recovery bases, and other data for each 
mission from FY2008 to FY2012. We then sorted missions by total mission requirement 
(TMR) codes. TMR codes are three-character codes assigned to every mission in naval 
aviation that denotes a given, general, and specific purpose of a flight (DON, 2009, p. 
306). See the appendix E for a complete list of SAR TMR codes. TMR codes were 
grouped into “SAR,” “Training,” and “Miscellaneous Support” categories and flight 
hours were aggregated according to those categories over the five-year period from 
FY2008 to FY2012. Of note, the SAR category included medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) and patient transport, along with missions specifically designated by TMR 
codes as SAR. SAR mission data were aggregated over a five-year period, and analyzed 
to determine the percentage of support to both DoD and non-DoD personnel.  
1. Yuma 
M-SHARP data reflected more than 5,000 total flight hours for the HH-1N 
conducted by SRU from FY2008 to FY2012. Of this, 82% were training hours, 15% were 
for miscellaneous support, and 3% were flight hours that supported missions related to 
SAR. Table 3 shows the breakdown of flight hours for SRU Yuma by mission category. 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of flight hours flown by SRU Yuma in support each 
mission requirement. 
Table 3.   SRU Yuma Flight Hours 2008–2012 
SRU Yuma Flight Hours FY08–FY12 by Mission 
Requirement 
Training 4,134.9 
Miscellaneous Support 752.1 
SAR 144.6 




Figure 5.  SRU Yuma SAR Mission as a Percentage of Total Flight Hours 2008–2012 
There were a total of 65 SAR missions conducted by the SRU from FY2008 to 
FY2012; 58% of the SAR missions flown went to support non-DoD personnel, with the 
remaining 42% used in support of the DoD. Figure 6 shows the amount of support given 
by SRU Yuma to DoD and non-DoD personnel by year from 2008 to 2012. Figure 7 
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Figure 6.  SRU Yuma Number SAR Missions Supporting DoD and Non-DoD Personnel 
2008–2012 
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2. Cherry Point 
M-SHARP data reflected more than 4,500 total flight hours for VMR-1’s HH-46E 
aircraft from FY2008 to FY2012. Of this, 69% were training hours, 23% were for 
miscellaneous support, and 8% of flight hours supported SAR related missions. Table 4 
shows the breakdown of flight hours for VMR-1 by mission category. Figure 8 shows the 
percentage of flight hours flown by VMR-1 in support each mission requirement, and 
figure 9 breaks down SAR mission between DoD and non-DoD missions. 
Table 4.   VMR-1 Flight Hours 2008–2012  
VMR-1 Flight Hours FY08-FY12 By Mission Requirement 
Training 3,105.60 
Miscellaneous Support 1,034.80 
SAR 378.3 
Total Flight Hours 4,518.70 
 14 
 
Figure 8.  VMR-1 SAR Mission as a Percentage of Total Flight Hours for 2008–2012 
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There were 162 SAR missions conducted by VMR-1 from FY2008 to FY2012; 
85% of those missions supported persons outside of the DoD, while only 15% of 
missions were flown in support of DoD personnel. Figure 10 shows the percentage of 
support to each group over the 2008–2012 period. 
 
Figure 10.  VMR-1 Percentage of SAR Missions Supporting DoD and Non-DoD Tasking 
2008–2012 
E. PROBLEM 
According to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-2 Aviation Operations 
(HQMC, 2000), the six functions of Marine Aviation are assault support, anti-air warfare, 
offensive air support, electronic warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, and aerial 
reconnaissance. These doctrinally mandated functions complement the functions of the 
ground combat element (GCE) and logistics combat element (LCE) and enable the 
Marine Air–Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to carry out the execution of its assigned 





VMR-1 SAR Missions  
DOD vs. Non-DOD FY2008-2012 
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that are organic to Marine Aviation. SAR is not one of these six functions, nor does it 
exist as a doctrinal mission category within Marine Aviation (HQMC, 2000, pp. 15-20). 
Since 2008, however, the Marine Corps has executed nearly 200 SAR missions, rescuing 
hundreds of military personnel and civilians. This means that the Marine Corps continues 
to invest resources each year in a capability that is not a core competency. Assuming the 
Marine Corps will continue to invest in SAR in order to provide decreased response time 
for personnel in the event it is needed, is there a more efficient way to do so that would 
allow the Marine Corps to achieve cost savings and redirect those resources toward its 
critical warfighting functions or reductions in spending?   
Divesture of local base SAR units has been identified in various reports over the 
past two decades as an option that could produce cost savings for the Marine Corps. With 
on-going fiscal constraints and the prospect of future budget cuts, the Marine Corps has 
been seeking to reduce unnecessary spending. At the Marine Corps Thesis Research 
Group (TRWG) hosted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in April 2013, 
representatives from Headquarters Marine Corps, Aviation Plans and Policies (APP-51) 
presented a research proposal from the Deputy Commandant for Marine Aviation (DCA) 
to study the costs and alternatives for Marine Corps local base SAR, specifically, whether 
or not a commercially contracted SAR service will be more cost effective than continuing 
to maintain the SRUs at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma.  
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: Would a commercial contract for SAR service at 
MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma be a more cost-effective alternative than 
continuing to maintain local base SRUs at each location? 
Secondary Research Questions: What are the estimated future costs of SRUs at 
MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma? What is the estimated future cost associated with 
a contract for Marine Corps local base SAR service? 
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G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
In Chapter II, we review the most relevant and current studies that address the 
costs of SAR service for the DON.  
In Chapter III, we discuss the methodology used in our analysis, provide an 
overview of the steps of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and explain our use of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB; 1992) Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates 
for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs. We then lay out our methodology 
approach, specifically addressing the CBA steps for our cost-based analysis of local base 
SAR at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma. 
We begin Chapter IV by examining the cost associated with the status quo, along 
with a discussion about the sources of our data. We then present our assumptions and 
considerations for analysis and lay out our findings of the current and projected costs 
associated with local base SAR units at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma. 
Following our discussion of the current situation, we present the modernization costs 
associated with the procurement of the HH-1Y per the aviation plan (AVPLAN). Lastly, 
we provide an estimate of the costs associated with a commercial contract for SAR 
services.    
In Chapter V, we compare the cost of each alternative, draw conclusions and 
make recommendations based on our analysis, and offer suggestions for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY RESEARCH 
The majority of scholarly research into Marine Corps local base SAR has come 
from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Several studies into Navy base SAR in the 
late 1990s evoked interest from the Marine Corps Chief of Staff for Aviation and led to 
additional analyses on SAR for the Marine Corps by CNA in 2000 and 2003. Although 
these reports are somewhat dated (more than a decade old), we examined the 
methodology and assumptions in the analyses and used the reports as a starting point for 
our study. Outside the CNA, only a handful of students at NPS have broached the topic of 
SAR costs and alternatives. We also examined their theses.  
B. STUDIES BY THE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES 
1. Outsourcing Helicopters for Land-based Search and Rescue by W. B. 
Boning, J. G. Ebert, J. D. Keenan, & P. C. Pedrick (1999) 
In a 1999 report published by CNA, Boning, Ebert, Keenan, and Pedrick (1999) 
analyzed costs and alternatives to land-based SAR service for the Navy. The report 
served as the predecessor to several subsequent reports that were tailored to the Marine 
Corps. The CNA report (Boning et al., 1999) also provided a significant amount of 
historical and contextual information regarding SAR service throughout the DoD, and the 
military’s relationship to the National SAR Plan. Although Boning et al. (1999) 
acknowledged the benefits of Navy SAR service for local communities, their report 
repeatedly returned to the sole justification for Navy land-based SAR service, which is to 
“provide SAR for Navy operations” (p. 2). As a result, the scope of their study focused 
on SAR service for the Navy and on the associated costs and viable alternatives to 
provide comparable SAR service. For simplicity, their report ignored any impact for SAR 
coverage for external governments or municipalities.  
The CNA report (Boning et al., 1999) analyzed SAR at 14 naval air stations 
(NAS). For each location, the report considered the SAR requirements (based on the 
commanders’ mandates for availability, coverage, and capabilities), historical demand for 
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services, and the SAR units (manning, airframes, flight hours, and mission data). 
Alternatives for each location included other DoD assets, local government services, and 
contracts with commercial helicopter services.  Cost calculations were derived from data 
taken from visibility and management of operations and support costs (VAMOSC), 
survey data from 13 of the 14 SAR units, and records of contracted maintenance costs 
from NAS Meridian and NAS Pensacola (Boning et al., 1999, p. 99). Using VAMOSC 
data, Boning et al. (1999) broke down average cost and organizational personnel cost per 
helicopter and by type (p. 100). They also used survey data to determine then-current 
manning levels rather than using an actual T/O to make these determinations because 
actual manning often differed greatly from that authorized in the T/O. Finally, the report 
included contract maintenance costs (four of the 14 locations used contracted 
maintenance support instead of military personnel to conduct aircraft maintenance; 
Boning et al., 1999, p. 100).  
In estimating costs for alternatives, Boning et al. (1999) used estimates from two 
commercial helicopter service providers, as well as prices for existing contracted 
helicopter services with the Department of the Interior. The contract price estimates they 
used in their report also considered then-current annual fixed costs as well as variable 
costs associated with actual flying hours. Their report incorporated special over-water 
aircrew considerations and partial fulfillment of SAR aircrew requirements by Navy 
rescue swimmers (Boning et al., 1999, p. 102). All of the cost estimates they used were 
adjusted to FY1998 dollars. None of their cost estimates projected future costs, and only 
then-present value-per-year amounts were used. 
When other DoD (or Coast Guard) assets were not viable alternatives, Boning et 
al. (1999) recommended outsourcing SAR services because cost estimates for 
outsourcing were significantly cheaper than maintaining the SAR units and still provided 
comparable capability. Of the 14 locations, Boning et al. (1999) recommended that only 
one, NAS Meridian, eliminate its SAR capability and rely instead on local civilian and 
government helicopter service (p. 3). 
We frame our analysis differently than Boning et al. (1999). First, in the case of a 
commercial SAR contract, we do not assume any fulfillment of rescue swimmer 
 20 
responsibilities by the Navy. Rescue swimmer capabilities are now commonly available 
in the commercial SAR industry. As a result, the Navy would not be required to provide 
it to a commercial provider. Second, we project costs for 10 years instead of seven. Third, 
we do not make any assumptions about flight hours on the part of the commercial 
provider. We contrived cost estimates for the SAR contracts based on SAR capability and 
availability. Lastly, we used manpower cost data from VAMOSC instead of surveys. 
2. Outsource Land-Based SAR? by P. C. Pedrick & J. D.  Keenan (2000b) 
In March 2000, the CNA published a briefing by Pedrick and Keenan as a follow-
on analysis to a similar 1999 report. In this report, Pedrick and Keenan (2000b) expanded 
cost projections of Navy land-based SAR to FY2012 (in FY2000 year dollars). By 
extending this timeframe, Pedrick and Keenan (2000b) were able to include the 
acquisition, remanufacturing and disposal costs and contrasted these with commercially 
contracted SAR alternatives. In their briefing, Pedrick and Keenan (2000b) considered an 
option to follow the Navy’s plan, which did not include a commercial contract for SAR. 
They also considered an option to retain SAR units and airframes but to reorganize to an 
operational model that mirrored that of a commercial provider, which would mean only a 
single helicopter would be available for SAR per location instead of three helicopters. 
The last option they posed was a commercial contract of all SAR services, to include 
aircraft, pilots, aircrew (except rescue swimmers), and maintenance (Pedrick & Keenan, 
2000b, p. 5). 
Pedrick and Keenan (2000b) highlighted that the Navy had planned to purchase 
large quantities of CH-60Ss, to remanufacture existing SH-60 variants into SH-60Rs, and 
to phase out all other type/model/series (T/M/S) helicopters between FY2000 and 
FY2012. The acquisition and remanufacturing costs comprised the majority of the overall 
costs associated with the Navy’s plan as compared to contracted alternatives (Pedrick & 
Keenan, 2000b, p. 4).  
The briefing provided detailed assumptions on commercial options that would 
have included contracting SAR service to a commercial helicopter provider. Pedrick and 
Keenan (2000b) considered three different civilian helicopters, based on purchase and 
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operating costs, range, loiter time, speed, and passenger capacity. All three helicopters 
met or greatly exceeded performance requirements for SAR based on historical SAR 
mission data, average distances to rescues, response times, and the number of people 
rescued per mission. Pedrick and Keenan (2000b) chose the Bell 412EP for its low 
operating costs, although its purchase price was marginally the highest (p. 10). They 
assumed that the Navy would provide hangars and workspace to a commercial SAR 
provider, as well as continue to provide rescue swimmers for SAR service. The 
commercial SAR service provider would provide pilots and maintenance crews. Pedrick 
and Keenan (2000b) estimated costs using flying hour assumptions based on data from 
the four SAR units with the highest usage (p. 7). 
They compared costs between maintaining one, two, or three SH-60R helicopters, 
and a between contracting for a commercial service. The commercial service was 
estimated to have significantly lower yearly annual costs through FY2012 than 
maintaining the SAR units within the Navy (Pedrick & Keenan, 2000b, p. 12). However, 
the analysis did not consider qualitative costs and benefits, such as positive public 
relations or mutually beneficial intergovernmental agreements; or manpower assignment 
policies, such as highly desirable shore duty or dwell time ratios (Pedrick & Keenan, 
2000b, p. 16). Although our analysis likewise does not consider these types of qualitative 
costs or benefits, we do recommend a thorough exploration of these factors in order to 
calculate a true net present value (NPV) or support any change with regard to the future 
of Marine Corps local base SAR. 
3. Alternatives for the USMC’s Local Base SAR by P. C. Pedrick & J. D. 
Keenan (2000, 2003).  
In 2000, the CNA began research on alternatives for Marine Corps SAR at the 
request of the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation. Pedrick and Keenan 
published their report first in 2000, and then updated the report in 2003. Their 2000 
report considered the four Marine Corps air stations (MCAS) that, at that time, still 
operated their own base SAR: Beaufort, Cherry Point, Iwakuni, and Yuma (Pedrick & 
Keenan, 2000a, p. 2). Since the publication of their 2000 report, the Marine Corps has 
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closed the base SAR units at Beaufort and Iwakuni. Despite this, their report provides a 
starting point for updating their analysis of base SAR at Cherry Point and Yuma.  
Pedrick and Keenan’s 2000 report provided a thorough breakout of descriptive 
statistics of SAR unit activity, mission data, and flight hours, and also SAR unit 
composition including airframes and personnel. Their report first considered cost 
estimates (in FY2001 dollars) for continued SAR operations of three HH-46D helicopters 
at Cherry Point and three HH-1N helicopters at Yuma. They considered this as a baseline 
for comparison to other alternatives but purposefully excluded acquisition and upgrading 
costs. Using fiscal year FY2001 costs in both reports, Pedrick and Keenan considered 
operations and maintenance (O&M), military personnel (MILPERS), and aviation 
procurement (AP) budget projections to estimate base SAR costs through FY2010 
(Pedrick & Keenan, 2000a, p. 17). 
The first alternative offered by Pedrick and Keenan (2000a) was to upgrade all 
SAR aircraft to HH-46E or HH-1Y. The HH-46Ds at Cherry Point would be upgraded in 
2004, and the HH-1N in Yuma would be upgraded in 2008. The second alternative they 
presented was to upgrade all SAR assets to HH-46Es at both Cherry Point and Yuma. 
Both of these alternatives resulted in increased cost estimates from the baseline $361.8 
million to $394.9 and $375 million, respectively, through FY2010 (Pedrick & Keenan, 
2000a, pp. 18–19).  
Pedrick and Keenan’s (2000a) third estimate used the same aircraft make-up as in 
the second alternative but included the use of a commercial contract for organizational-
level maintenance that would begin in FY2004. Their last alternative was to use a 
commercial provider for both maintenance and SAR operations including aircraft, 
aircrew, and pilots. The SAR contract would provide for 24-hour service with one 
helicopter continuously available for immediate operations, and one helicopter available 
as a back-up. No other specifics regarding the assumed contractual agreement (such as 
over-water rescue or all-weather capabilities) were mentioned. In both the third 
and fourth alternatives, Pedrick and Keenan (2000a) estimated a significant cost 
reduction, with a savings of approximately $90 and 180 million, respectively, through 
FY2010 (pp. 19–20).  
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Pedrick and Keenan (2000a) retrieved data for this report from the Naval Center 
for Cost Analysis (NCCA), maintenance contracts from NAS Meridian and Pensacola, 
and cost estimates from Petroleum Helicopters Incorporated (PHi; Pedrick & Keenan, 
2000a, p. 19). Their report does not forecast or attempt to predict future demand for SAR. 
The report also omits any analysis of effects on the community, political implications, 
impacts to the National SAR Plan, or other qualitative costs or benefits. Their report 
concludes with a specific recommendation that the Marine Corps outsource its SAR 
mission to a commercial firm at an annual savings of $25 million per year (Pedrick & 
Keenan, 2000a, p. 2).  
In 2003, the CNA published an updated follow-on report to Pedrick and Keenan’s 
2000 analysis. The 2003 report was almost identical to their work from 2000. The only 
significant difference was that MCAS Iwakuni SAR was omitted from the analysis 
because it had been closed. This change yielded different numerical estimations but an 
identical succession of cost magnitude and, as a result, identical conclusions with regards 
to alternatives. Pedrick and Keenan (2003) again showed that outsourcing commercial 
SAR would yield a significant cost savings to the Marine Corps. The Deputy 
Commandant for Marine Aviation (DCA) has recently requested an updated analysis, 
similar to their reports, to be used to support decisions regarding the future of Marine 
Corps base SAR. 
Although our analysis most closely mirrors Pedrick and Keenan’s 2003 report, 
there are some key differences in our analysis. According to the FY2013 Marine Aviation 
Plan, all SAR helicopters will transition to the new HH-1Y by FY2016; however, this had 
not yet been planned when Pedrick and Keenan formulated alternatives for Marine Corps 
SAR in 2000 and 2003. This was a significant factor in our analysis with regards to 
estimating procurement cost. Moreover, we found significant changes to the procurement 
cost and fielding schedule of the HH-1Y. Thus, our estimates provide an updated and 
more complete analysis regarding these costs to Marine Corps SAR. Additionally, we 
include modernization cost estimates and found significant costs associated with 
modifying the HH-1Y that were previously not considered in any CNA report.  
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Lastly, instead of using budget numbers, we estimated the procurement and O&S 
cost of the first 10 years for the HH-1Y (based on a 30-year life cycle cost [LCC]) and 
projected costs using the UH-1N annual O&S costs as an analogy to determine total cost 
of SAR to the Marine Corps over 10 years. We compared this estimate with three 
different SAR contract estimates (each with unique capabilities and costs) instead of only 
one (as in Pedrick and Keenan’s 2003 report).  
C. STUDIES BY THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
1. Comparative Analysis of Benefits Received From Naval Air Station 
Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission by R. K. Brodin (1998) 
The first NPS thesis relevant to our research is a thesis by R. K. Brodin (1998). 
His thesis was designed to complement a then-forthcoming CNA report, which was 
subsequently published in 1999, on outsourcing Navy local base SAR. He approached the 
issue of outsourcing (OMB, 1999, para. 4) and addressed whether Navy SAR was a core 
function, whether Navy SAR was an inherently governmental function, and whether there 
was commercial competition among private sector firms to provide SAR service for the 
government (Brodin, 1998, p. 2). 
Brodin’s (1998) thesis then sought to find the non-direct economic costs and 
benefits to outsourcing SAR (p. 2). He considered only non-direct benefits and costs, or 
those gross benefits that are difficult to quantify. He grouped these benefits into four 
broad categories: personnel experience, personnel rotation, service performed, and public 
relations. He sought to evaluate whether these should be included in a best-value 
determination for the government (Brodin, 1998, p. 1).  
Brodin (1998) created questionnaires for various personnel from two SAR units. 
The questionnaires were designed to gather data on the qualitative costs and benefits of 
local base SAR as compared to a commercial SAR service. Brodin (1998) then used 
Decision Support Software Expert Choice Pro to analyze chosen qualitative factors (p. 
67). He concluded that SAR was not established as an inherently governmental function 
and provided analysis of two examples of commercial outsourcing to support this 
conclusion. Overall, his analysis was not conclusive as to whether to outsource, nor did it 
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quantify benefits of maintaining local base SAR units. However, Brodin (1998) did posit 
that those qualitative factors contribute to the government’s best-value calculation and 
should therefore be included in future analyses (p. 86). His analysis did reveal that 
outsourcing would have potential impacts to unit-level manpower. For example, he found 
that SAR aircrew, ground crew, and pilots spent a significant portion of their time on the 
job performing collateral assignment duties like legal administration, security, and 
logistics (Brodin, 1998, p. 81). 
Brodin (1998) focused on qualitative costs and benefits, and relied on 
questionnaire data for his analysis. He exposed a few qualitative factors that may be 
appropriate for further research; however, these factors are outside the scope of our 
analysis. Our research focuses solely on cost analysis and comparison, and relies on 
historical expenditure data and cost projections.  
Brodin does, however, question the Navy’s requirement for SAR by examining 
whether SAR is a core competency. This facet of his analysis is directly related to our 
research, as we examine Marine Corps local base SAR in the context of the National 
SAR Plan, which mandates that the Air Force and the Coast Guard provide SAR service. 
We posit the fact that SAR is not a doctrinal responsibility for the Marine Corps and 
suggest further research into repositioning existing governmental assets to meet required 
coverage and response times for the Marine Corps. 
2. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis of Alternative Force 
Structures for Fulfillment of the United States Marine Corps 
Operational Support Airlift and Search and Rescue Missions by E. T. 
Chase  (2000) 
A second NPS thesis relevant to our research was written by E. T. Chase in 2000. 
In his thesis, Chase analyzed both the cost and effectiveness of various force structure 
alternatives for Marine Corps operational support aircraft (OSA) and SAR units. In his 
analysis of costs, Chase (2000) considered 20-year (LCCs), which included research, 
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E); procurement; O&S; conversion and 
disposal; and manpower costs.  
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Chase (2000) analyzed four alternatives. The first alternative included the 
employment of 14 C-12 aircraft as OSA and the conversion of 12 CH-46E helicopters 
into HH-46E helicopters to support SAR (three HH-46Es at each Beaufort, Cherry Point, 
Yuma, and Iwakuni). The second alternative included upgrading from the C-12 to the C-
35 for OSA and maintaining the same SAR assets as in the first alternative. The third 
alternative included the employment of the HV-609 tilt rotor aircraft for both OSA and 
SAR. However, this alternative is now outmoded because the Marine Corps has since 
changed its plan and no longer intends to use tilt rotor aircraft for OSA and SAR 
missions. 
Using the Excel plug-in Crystal Ball and cost data (converted to FY1998 dollars) 
obtained from the NCCA, Chase (2000) concluded that the CH-46 (the second 
alternative) had the lowest LCC, making it the least expensive alternative for Marine 
Corps local base SAR operations (p. 51). However, he did not consider commercial SAR 
support as an alternative to provide local base SAR.  
In its analysis of operational effectiveness, Chase (2000) chose aircraft speed, 
range, landing site requirements, payload, and time on station as measures of 
effectiveness in conducting SAR. These measures of effectiveness provided a 
quantitative baseline of aircraft capabilities and limitations for comparison between 
aircraft alternatives. Chase (2000) used Logical Decision for Windows to analyze 
measures of effectiveness and concluded that the most effective platform was the HV-609 
tilt rotor aircraft (p. 81). 
Chase’s measures of effectiveness are similar to the criteria we used in comparing 
aircraft alternatives in our research. However, our research provides a more complete 
analysis of SAR costs. Instead of program office estimates (which Chase used), we used 
cost data from VAMOSC, which is the authoritative repository for Navy cost data. 
VAMOSC also provided us other data useful in calculating cost per flight hour and 
aircraft inventories. Additionally, we included SAR-specific modification costs, which 
we found to be significant with respect to the total cost of SAR modernization.  
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3. Cost Analysis for a Dedicated Search and Rescue Capability for 
Commander Strike Fighter Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet by R. Biros, N. 
Corpuz, C. Hines, and T. Riggs (2009) 
In their thesis, Biros, Corpuz, Hines, and Riggs (2009) approached local base 
SAR from a different perspective by focusing their research specifically on SAR 
capabilities at NAS Lemoore. NAS Lemoore was the largest jet base on the west coast 
and the only jet base with no dedicated SAR capability. Despite having increased its 
number of flying squadrons and its offshore training airspace, its organic SAR capability 
was disbanded in 2004 as a cost-cutting measure, and no commercial SAR service was 
procured to replace it (Biros et al., 2009, p. 7). In their project, Biros et al. (2009) made a 
case for restoring local base SAR efforts to NAS Lemoore. The status quo would have 
been to allow NAS Lemoore to continue without organic SAR capability and rely on 
SAR service from the Coast Guard station in San Francisco. However, the status quo 
option was potentially fatal for downed aircrew due to cold water temperatures of the 
Pacific Ocean and the associated response times from San Francisco to retrieve survivors 
(Biros et al., 2009, p. 9). Biros et al. (2009) conducted a cost analysis of various 
alternatives to bring back a dedicated SAR capability to NAS Lemoore. In their analysis, 
they did not attempt to forecast future or long-term costs, but only considered the then-
current costs of re-establishing organic SAR capability. 
In four of their five alternatives, Biros et al. (2009) proposed solutions that would 
establish a SAR detachment at NAS Lemoore. Each of these four alternatives was 
modeled after other naval air stations with SAR capabilities (Whidbey, Fallon, China 
Lake) and called for the use of existing Navy helicopters. This way, they avoided 
acquisitions costs because they assumed that the inventory of Navy helicopters was 
sufficient to stand-up a detachment at NAS Lemoore (Biros et al., 2009, p. 10). Of these 
four alternatives, each had unique arrangements concerning the T/M/S of aircraft and 
manpower assignment policies. For example, one alternative (modeled after the SAR 
capability at NAS Fallon) would have assigned personnel to the SAR unit at NAS 
Lemoore under the category of temporary additional duty (TAD), whereas other 
alternatives permanently assigned personnel to the SAR unit at NAS Lemoore. Using 240 
hours of annual flight time for all the alternatives, Biros et al. (2009) compiled cost per 
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flight hour (CPH) data using maintenance and flight records from other SAR units. They 
also used administrative and personnel costs from other SAR units, and scaled them to fit 
NAS Lemoore.  
Ultimately, their recommendation was that their last alternative be adopted, which 
was for a commercial contracted service to provide SAR capabilities at NAS Lemoore, an 
alternative that was modeled after the air ambulance contract at Marine Corps Air-
Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC), in Twentynine Palms, CA. 
Although this alternative was only marginally the second least expensive, Biros et al. 
(2009) concluded that the costs of future acquisitions and upgrades of Navy aircraft 
would have surely dwarfed the costs of the commercial alternative (p. 14). 
This thesis was the only NPS thesis we found that considered a commercial 
contract to provide SAR service. However, their conclusion failed to acknowledge 
significant differences between the capabilities of the air ambulance contract at 
MAGTFTC and actual SAR service. SAR capability would necessarily include high-end 
capabilities to conduct over-water rescues with rescue swimmers, and hoist operations. 
We found that these capabilities significantly drive the cost of commercial SAR service 
and therefore should be included any cost analysis of commercial SAR. Our research 
compares similar alternatives; that is, we sought estimates from commercial SAR 
providers that include these similar high-end capabilities.  
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In this chapter we present the main steps of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which 
“is a policy assessment method that quantifies in monetary terms the value of all 
consequences of a policy to all members of society” (Boardman, Greenberg, Vining, & 
Weimer, 2011, p. 2). We then highlight the important elements of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB, 1992) Circular A-94 and discuss some different CBA 
formats, including the format we used in our research.  
B. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
CBA can be conducted in one of three ways: Ex ante CBA is conducted prior to 
execution of a project; ex post CBA comes at the end of a project; and in medias res CBA 
is conducted during the life cycle of a project. In any of these cases, CBA can be used to 
measure efficiency and provide data about how best to allocate resources (Boardman et 
al., 2011, p. 3). It provides policy-makers and resource managers with a “method for 
making direct comparisons among alternative policies” (Boardman et al., 2011, p. 27). 
According to Boardman et al. (2011, p. 6), there are nine basic steps of a CBA. In the 
following list, we outline these nine steps and explain how we applied them in our 
research.  
1. Specify the set of alternatives. In Chapter IV, we discuss the status quo 
(SAR units’ current costs) and then analyze costs associated two 
alternatives: modernization and a commercial contract. These alternatives 
were proposed by representatives from HQMC APP-51 and are based on 
previous studies conducted by CNA. We propose several additional 
alternatives as areas for further research in Chapter V.  
2. Decide whose benefits and costs count (known as standing). For the 
purposes of this thesis, we define standing in terms of interests to the 
United States Marine Corps. In particular, we focus on the best use of the 
Marine Corps’ resources to execute its assigned war-fighting missions 
(Deputy, 2013). Therefore, we consider in this thesis only those costs and 
benefits that impact the Marines Corps and its ability to carry out its 
assigned war-fighting functions.  
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3. Identify the impact categories, catalogue them, and select measurement 
indicators. Ideally, all categories impacted by a policy could be captured 
and measured. However, social impacts and other qualitative costs and 
benefits can be nearly impossible to definitively monetize. We limit our 
analysis to a comparison of costs only.  
4. Predict and monetize the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project. 
We obtained cost data for the presented alternatives from VAMOSC and 
examined O&S costs associated with the SAR units at MCAS Cherry Point 
and MCAS Yuma. Additionally, we obtained acquisition and 
modernization costs from the Defense Acquisitions Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) and the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) program office PMA-276. Lastly, we considered cost data from 
existing commercial helicopter services and aircraft maintenance contracts 
at various military installations. We assumed a 30-year life cycle for SAR 
helicopters in our cost-based analysis. 
5. Discount benefits and costs to obtain present values (PVs). We normalized 
the data to FY2014 dollars and forecasted costs for each alternative 10 
years into the future using the predictor function in Oracle’s Crystal Ball 
plug-in for Microsoft Excel. 
6. Compute the net present value (NPV) of each alternative. We ignored the 
benefits for each alternative in this analysis and thus did not calculate a true 
NPV. Instead, we considered only O&S, procurement, and contract costs.  
7. Perform a sensitivity analysis. Our analysis considers specific sources of 
uncertainty, upper and lower bounds from procurement costs estimates, and 
confidence limits (10% and 90%) for yearly variances in O&S costs 
associated with SAR units. 
8. Make a recommendation. In this thesis, we recommended only the 
alternative with the lowest cost. However, we also recommended that 
future analyses of qualitative impacts include both costs and benefits in 
order to more accurately assess the true NPV of each alternative. 
C. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
Although the CBA process can be applied universally across public and private 
sectors, OMB (1992) Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis of Federal Programs provides guidance specifically geared to a national 
perspective and designed to “promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed 
decision-making by the federal government” (para. 1). Circular A-94 provides direction 
for CBA of federal programs in order to make sound cost comparisons, and outlines the 
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CBA process in four elements: policy rationale, explicit assumptions, evaluation of 
alternatives, and verification (OMB, 1992, para. 5.c). 
CBA encompasses a broad range of analysis; as a result, it can take different 
forms. One such form is a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). CEA is “a less 
comprehensive technique [than CBA], but it can be appropriate when the benefits from 
competing alternatives are the same or where a policy decision has been made that the 
benefits must be provided” (OMB, 1992, para. 5). CEA is often used in lieu of CBA in 
defense policy because of the common limitations associated with predicting the loss of 
life, or the difficulties associated with monetizing social impacts or public opinion. 
According to OMB (1992),  
A program is cost-effective if, on the basis of life cycle cost analysis of 
competing alternatives, it is determined to have the lowest costs expressed 
in present value terms for a given amount of benefits. Cost effectiveness 
analysis is appropriate whenever it is unnecessary or impractical to 
consider the dollar value of the benefits provided by the alternatives under 
consideration. This is the case whenever (i) each alternative has the same 
annual benefits expressed in monetary terms; or (ii) each alternative has 
the same annual effects, but dollar values cannot be assigned to their 
benefits. (para. 5.a.2.b). 
D. COST-BASED ANALYSIS 
In this thesis, we follow a CEA more closely than a CBA; however, we do not 
analyze benefits because we considered them to be outside the scope of our research 
questions. As such, we focus solely on a cost-based analysis between alternatives and 
ignore any benefits. We project future costs of alternatives and then discount these to a 
PV, allowing for a comparison. Our cost-based analysis stops short of deriving a true 
NPV, which would be “the discounted monetized value of expected net benefits” (OMB, 
1992, para. 5.b), and focuses on investment and cost savings internal to the federal 
government. 
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The cost-based analysis conducted in this thesis examines the current cost of 
USMC SAR operations at Cherry Point and Yuma using historical cost data from both 
units. In addition we examine the cost of two alternatives discussed with representatives 
from Aviation Plans and Policy (APP-51) at Headquarters Marine Corps. Alternatives 
analyzed in this study include the costs for planned aircraft procurement along with 
estimations of the future O&S costs associated with those upgrades. We highlight recent 
changes in the availability of commercial helicopter service to provide SAR and present a 
cost estimate based on recent governmental outsourcing of SAR and related helicopter 
services. This outsourcing alternative is then compared to the current cost and estimated 
costs associated with the upgrade option to facilitate the readers ability to determine the 
most suitable alternative relative to cost and performance. 
B. DATA 
Our research combines data from the Marines Corps’ current Aviation Plan 
(AVPLAN), the Navy’s Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) database, and the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval 
(DAMIR), along with publically available information regarding governmental 
outsourcing of SAR functions to various commercial firms. The Marine Corps AVPLAN 
“supports the force structure initiatives approved under the Marine Aviation Transition 
Strategy (MATS) and the anticipated requirements resulting from the implementation of 
the Defense Policy Review Initiative FY16” (Deputy Commandant for Marine Aviation 
[DCA], 2012). VAMOSC is the management information system that  
collects and reports US Navy and Marine Corps historical operating and support 
(O&S) costs. VAMOSC provides the direct O&S costs of weapon systems, some 
indirect costs (e.g., ship depot overhead), and related non-cost information such as 
flying hour metrics, steaming hours, age of aircraft, etc. (Defense Acquisition 
University [DAU], 2011).  
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The DAMIR system is “a DoD initiative that provides enterprise visibility to 
Acquisition program information. DAMIR streamlines acquisition management and 
oversight by leveraging web services, authoritative data sources, data collection, and data 
repository capabilities” (DAMIR, 2013). 
C. DESCRIPTION OF STATUS QUO AND ALTERNATIVES 
1. Status Quo 
Status quo offers a bench mark estimate of costs; however, the status quo is not a 
viable option for the future because current aircraft have reached the end of their service 
life. Our analysis of the status quo examines the current O&S cost of Marine Corps SAR. 
O&S includes MILPERS costs and O&M costs. A one-year forecast based on 10 years of 
historical data is provided.  
2. HH-1Y Upgrade 
The Marine Corps currently intends to replace all SAR aircraft with the HH-1Y. 
This alternative dictates that the Marine Corps execute the AVPLAN as currently written 
and calls for the HH-46E helicopters located at MCAS Cherry Point, and HH-1N 
helicopters located at MCAS Yuma, to be replaced by HH-1Y helicopters. Our analysis 
of this alternative assumes a 30-year life cycle for HH-1Y and no change to operational 
level (O-level) maintenance or existing support structures. The Life-Cycle Costs (LCCs) 
presented in this analysis consist of procurement costs associated with UH-1Y and both 
the RDT&E as well as the procurement costs associated with the necessary modifications 
to make it an HH-1Y. Additionally, the associated O&S costs will be added to the 
amortized procurement and modification costs to determine the total cost estimate of the 
platform. Our analysis provides both an annual cost estimate along with the estimated 
cost of the HH-1Y aircraft over a 10-year period. 
3. Commercial Outsourcing 
This alternative is to outsource SAR in one or both locations to a commercial 
provider who can perform the mission and meet Marine Corps criteria for capability and 
readiness. The nature of SAR operations makes aircraft performance increasingly 
important; however, costs are also highly correlated with this metric. Therefore, to ensure 
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that alternatives presented in this analysis do not emphasize cost savings at the expense of 
capability (and assume unknown risk), our analysis focuses on commercial SAR 
providers that have similar or greater aircraft performance, and rescue and medical 
capabilities as current Marine Corps SAR. We provide relevant performance 
characteristics of each alternative aircraft later in this chapter. By providing these 
capabilities, readers can better understand the trade space between cost and performance 
and make more accurate comparisons between alternatives. This alternative assumes that 
the contractor will provide the helicopters, pilots, maintenance support, medical 
personnel, and rescue technicians to conduct 24-7 SAR operations. This alternative also 
assumes that the Marine Corps will provide necessary facilities for the contactors to 
perform operations at each location, such as workspaces and hangars; however, no new 
military construction (MILCON) is considered. 
D. ANALYSIS OF STATUS QUO 
1. Current Cost of Marine Corps Search and Rescue 
To determine the current cost of SAR to the Marine Corps, historical O&S costs 
associated with the HH-1N, HH-46D, and HH-46E were used. We assume that these aircraft 
have exceeded their expected service life and that all procurement costs have been 
depreciated. Therefore, we do not include the procurement of these legacy assets in our 
analysis of the current units’ cost. To conduct our cost analysis, we obtained 10 years of 
historical cost data from VAMOSC for each T/M/S aircraft used by VMR-1 and SRU to 
conduct SAR operations. We normalized the cost data to FY2014 dollars and account for 
each HH-1N, HH-46D, and HH-46E airframe within the Navy inventory from 2003 to 2012.  
The cost data obtained from VAMOSC contained the complete breakdown of the 
cost element structure (CES) for all units operating the HH-1N, HH-46D, and HH-46E 
aircraft. Costs related to each T/M/S aircraft are separated into relevant elements that 
facilitate the identification of relevant O&S costs. The major cost elements accounted for 
in the VAMOSC data are unit level manpower, unit level operations, maintenance, 
sustaining support, and continuing system improvement. Table 5 briefly illustrates how 
this cost data are separated by element for each T/M/S. The complete CES from 
VAMOSC is given in Appendix B. 
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Table 5.   Example of VAMOSC Cost Element Structure for SAR Squadrons 
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We summed O&S costs in the data that could be directly attributed to VMR-1 and 
SRU by fiscal year. We allocated cost data that existed in the VAMOSC database as cost 
pools and that consisted of shared costs among units operating the same T/M/S aircraft to 
Marine SAR units via the following method. In these instances, we determined VMR-1 
and SRU O&S costs by multiplying the specific FY shared cost pool by the percentage of 
aircraft in the relevant Marine Corps SAR unit for that fiscal year. We then input the 
costs determined to be attributed to each Marine SAR unit into our cost data and used 
those costs to conduct further analysis. We used this method to estimate intermediate (I-
level) maintenance, depot-level maintenance, sustainment and support, and continuing 
system improvement costs of SRU for the HH-1N data from 2003 to 2008 and of VMR-1 
for the HH-46D in 2003 and 2004. Where pooled costs were predominantly determined 
to be driven by Navy units operating the same T/M/S and costs were not proportional to 
the percentage of Marine Corps SAR aircraft, our analysis used an average of later year 
costs, which could be directly linked to Marine SAR units. We then input the average of 
these direct costs from later years into our cost data and used them in our analysis. We 
used this method to determine the cost of I-level maintenance Navy manpower and I-
level maintenance other Navy manpower in 2003 and 2004 for VMR-1. 
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2. Cost of VMR-1 and SRU 
Once each Marine SAR unit O&S costs were separated from the rest of the raw 
data, we then used the cost data to construct cost models for each SAR unit. These 
models provide historical reference and a basis for comparison of future costs. Our 
analysis determined that the average O&S cost to conduct SAR operations each year for 
the Marine Corps from 2003 to 2012 in FY-2014 dollars was $21,019,412. During that 
period, the average cost for VMR-1 to conduct SAR was $12,997,506; and the average 
cost for SRU Yuma to conduct SAR was $8,021,906. Additionally, during that period, 
costs varied between $10,456,699 and $17,968,689 for VMR-1 and between $4,946,344 
and $10,308,786 for SRU. The primary cost driver for both units during this period was 
an increase in maintenance and support costs. Figures 11 and 12 depict the O&S costs for 
each unit. O&S costs are broken into continuing system improvements, sustainment and 
support, maintenance and support, unit-level operations, and unit-level manpower costs. 
Because RDT&E and procurement costs have been previously discounted for these 
legacy aircraft, the O&S costs represent the total cost to the Marine Corps for these units.  
 39 
 
Figure 11.  VMR-1 HH-46D/E Annual O&S Costs 
 

































The Marine Corps annual cost to conduct SAR operations from 2003 to 2012 is 
presented in Figure 13. The total costs for both units range from a low of $15,456,468 in 
2003 to a high of $26,421,551 in 2012. The average cost to the Marine Corps of conduct 
SAR during this period was $21,019,412. Figure 13 shows the total O&S cost of Marine 
Corps SAR from 2003 to 2012. Note that costs trended upward over the 10-year period. 
 
Figure 13.  Total O&S Costs 
E. ANALYSIS OF UPGRADE ALTERNATIVE  
1. Transition to the HH-1Y 
Transitioning SAR aircraft to the HH-1Y is the planned course of action for the 
Marine Corps. It involves the procurement of six HH-1Y helicopters, which are based on 
the UH-1Y airframe. The UH-1Y utility helicopter, manufactured by Bell Helicopter 
Incorporated, provides improved capabilities over the UH-1N. This four-bladed aircraft 
offers increased speed and payload carrying capacity, along with upgraded avionics, and 














Table 6.   UH-1Y Performance characteristics (Naval Air Systems Command 
[NAVAIR], 2013) 
UH-1Y “Venom” 
Function Assault Support 
Prime Contractor Boeing 
Crew 4 
Speed Maximum 170 knots 
Range 258 nautical miles (combat load) 
Useful Load / Litters 6,660 lbs / 6 litters 
 
The program is currently in the operations and sustainment phase, and is being 
operated from both combat and shipboard environments (DoD, 2012, p. 4). These 
helicopters are expected to replace the fleet of legacy SAR helicopters.  See figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  UH-1Y Photo  (after Bell Helicopter, 2013b) 
Six HH-1Y helicopters total are to be fielded to the SAR units at MCAS Cherry 
Point and Yuma, three aircraft at each location. The FY2013 AVPLAN reflects MCAS 
Yuma SAR unit beginning this transition to the HH-1Y in fourth quarter of FY2014; 
however, that transition has been delayed one year until fourth quarter of FY2015 (S. 
Deputy, personal communication, July 15, 2013).  The AVPLAN also reflects MCAS 
Cherry Point transitioning in second quarter of FY2016. Taken together, the updated plan 
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will reflect Marine Corps SAR units receiving all six HH-1Ys in FY2016 (Deputy 
Commandant for Marine Aviation [DCA], 2012). According to the Operations and 
Support Visual Analysis Tool (OSVAT) in VAMOSC, the service inventory count of 
UH-1Y helicopters was 61 as of FY2012, and the platform is being delivered to 
operational units throughout the Marine Corps at a rate of approximately 16 units per 
year. Aircraft are normally delivered about two years after procurement (J. Davis, 
personal communication, August 26, 2013). Using this information, we estimate the UH-
1Y units to become SAR assets will be production numbers 120–125 and that these assets 
will be procured during FY2014. Table 7 depicts the UH-1Y procurement profile. 
Table 7.   Procurement Profile for the UH-1Y from PMA-276 
FY 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total 
Number of 
Aircraft 6 4 7 9 11 15 19 18 15 16 15 15 10 160 
 
2. UH-1Y Costs 
We obtained cost data for the UH-1Y from DAMIR and the cost team at 
NAVAIR (PMA-276). This program office is responsible for “cradle to grave 
procurement, development, support, fielding and disposal of the Marine Corps rotary 
wing close air support, anti-armor, armed escort, armed/visual reconnaissance and fire 
support program systems” (NAVAIR, 2013). 
Our analysis uses total LCC as the basis to compare alternatives and determine 
the most cost effective SAR method. According to the Defense Acquisitions Guidebook 
(DAG; 2011), LCC include “research and development costs, investment costs, operating 
and support costs, and disposal costs over the entire life cycle” (p. 92)  However, our 
analysis differs from this definition in that it considers only options that are capable of 
performing SAR with existing technology and proven aircraft. Additionally, we limited 
our cost analysis to a 10-year projection of future costs due to the uncertainty of O&S 
forecast models beyond that point. 
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We used cost data from the H-1 Upgrades Selected Acquisition Report in 
DAMIR (DoD, 2012) to estimate costs for units 120–125 (the program costs to USMC 
SAR). We used average procurement acquisition cost (APUC) to base our cost 
estimations. APUC captures fly-away, weapon system, and procurement costs; it does not 
include research and development (R&D) costs (which are sunk), MILCON costs, or 
O&S costs.  
Because the UH-1Y has already been fully developed and is currently in service 
in the operating forces and supporting establishments throughout the Marine Corps, we 
treated RDT&E costs from the UH-1Y as sunk costs. Therefore, RDT&E costs of the 
UH-1Y program are not included as part of the analysis in this thesis. However, we 
consider the RDT&E costs associated modifications required to convert the UH-1Y to the 
HH-1Y relevant to SAR and include them. Additionally, we assume the disposal costs to 
be negligible and have omitted them.  
We estimated the UH-1Y procurement costs to USMC SAR using two different 
APUC estimates. In the first estimate, we mathematically derived the APUC of the six 
UH-1Y aircraft that are to be used for SAR by taking the program APUC listed in the 
selected acquisition report, applying learning curve theory and some basic assumptions to 
derive the cost estimate for the first unit, and then deriving the cost of units 120–125.  
Learning curve theory, specifically, the Crawford Unit Theory, is a quantitative 
tool commonly used to estimate costs associated with repetitively produced products. It 
was introduced in the 1930s and was originally applied to calculate labor hour efficiency 
in the production of airplanes (Stewart, 1990, p. 51). The formula represents a 
proportional, curvilinear decrease in production costs as manufacturers improve labor, 
engineering, development, and assembly practices of a given product.  The formula is: 
Y=AXb; where Y is unit cost; A is the cost of the first unit produced; X is the quantity 
number or “Xth” unit; and b is the learning curve (Stewart, 1990, p. 52). The learning 
curve exponent provides the slope to the formula and is equal to ln(.9)/ln(2) for a 90% 
learning curve. 
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Assuming a 90% learning curve, and using APUC as the cost of the 81st unit (the 
midpoint between 1 and 160), we estimated the cost of the first unit “A.” Then, using the 
derived A, we calculated the estimated cost of units 120–125 and converted to FY2014 
dollars using the inflation indices in the Naval Center for Cost Analysis Joint Inflation 
Calculator. Using this method, we estimated the average unit cost of the six aircraft to be 
$29,607,360, and the total cost to be $177,644,150 (FY2014 dollars).  Table 8 contains 
estimates derived from using this method. 
Table 8.   Learning Curve Estimated APUC of UH-1Y 
Per Unit Cost Estimate UH-1Y   

















125th unit    $29,516.08 
Total   $177,644.15 
 
In the second estimate, we obtained cost estimates directly from the cost team at 
NAVAIR PMA-276. The team was anticipating an overall cost increase for the UH-1Y 
program beginning in FY2014 because of a new cost accounting system at Bell called the 
“Business Modernization System,” which recently increased direct labor hours by 
combining various labor categories into indirect labor. Estimated labor rates were based 
on historical labor rates from previous lots of the UH-1Y. Estimates were then applied to 
derived learning curves and then multiplied by recommended labor rates from the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Materials were estimated similarly, 
using the bill of materials (BOM) from past lots, applying it to a learning curve, and 
multiplying by DCMA material rates (L. Davis, personal communication, August 26, 
2013). Using these methodologies and data, the cost team at PMA-276 estimated the 
APUC for UH-1Y in FY2014 to be $28,961,220 or $173,767,340 for all six aircraft 
(FY2014 dollars). Table 9 contains the program office estimates. 
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Table 9.   Program Office Estimated APUC of UH-1Y (after L. Davis, personal 
communication, August 22, 2013) 




Estimate for 6 units     $173,767.34 
 
The program office estimate was approximately 2% lower than our estimate. The 
average of both estimates was used for our analysis. Table 10 contains the average of the 
two estimates. 
Table 10.   Average Estimated APUC of UH-1Y 




Estimate for 6 units     $175,705.74 
 
3. UH-1Y to HH-1Y Conversion Costs 
SAR helicopters must meet certain capabilities requirements as per the Naval 
Aviation Training and Operating Standardization (NATOPS) General Flight and 
Operating Instructions (DON, 2009, pp. 169-179). As such, the UH-1Y helicopter is 
required to be retrofitted with specific modifications in order to be designated an HH-1Y 
and to be employed in a SAR capacity. The cost team at NAVAIR PMA-276 also 
provided the cost estimates for conversion of the UH-1Y to the HH-1Y.  
Major modifications include a powerful searchlight, a landing light, and a 
coupled-hover capability. Costs estimates for the landing light and searchlight (the SX-16 
“Nightsun”), taken from a rough order of magnitude (ROM) prepared by PMA-276 in 
2012, are based on historical conversion costs from the HH-1N and include R&D, 
engineering and logistics, and retrofit costs. The landing light is required for visual 
reference during SAR missions and is installed directly below the fuselage system (L. 
Criley, personal communication, August 27, 2013). The 50 million candlepower 
Nightsun is mounted on the port-side of the fuselage, just above the landing skid, and 
oriented to the front. It is operated by the co-pilot to provide illumination during use 




Figure 15.  Photograph and Illustration of Nightsun (after H. Vanderborght and L. Criley, 
personal communication, August 27, 2013). 
Coupled hover capability greatly increases the stability of the aircraft when 
hovering over a single point. The coupled hover requirement is specifically outlined in 
OPNAV 3710.7U (DON, 2009), paragraph 5.4.3: 
Helicopter/Tiltrotor Night Hover Operation over Water 
Night/low visibility hover operations over water shall be conducted using 
aircraft equipped with operable automatic hover systems (i.e., 
coupler/Doppler/AFCS equipment) on all occasions when a natural 
horizon visible from the cockpit is not available to assist the pilot in 
establishing/maintaining a stable hover. 
Coupled hover estimates included R&D, retrofit and O&S, cost increases, and 
were based on flight controls from the UH-60M upgrades program. Using an analogous 
cost method, we considered the previous flight control upgrades of other systems as a 
reference and used the upper and lower costs of these upgrades to provide a boundary for 
our analysis. In addition sensitivity analysis was conducted on the upper bound of $86.2 
million, which was taken from the UH-60M fly-by-wire system, as well as the lower 
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bound of $73.2 million, which was taken from a redesigned mechanical flight control 
system (H. Vanderborght, personal communication, July 31, 2013). All estimates reflect 
FY2014 dollars. 
Other minor modification costs include hoists and other ancillary equipment. 
Estimates for the hoist included the purchase of only two hoists because the Yuma SRU 
already has four of the six total hoists that will be required. Costs estimates for ancillary 
equipment, like litters and safety equipment, were considered negligible, as these items 
are to be taken from the existing SAR units HH-1N and HH-46E helicopters (L. Criley, 
personal communication, August 27, 2013). Table 11 lists both the per-aircraft cost and 
total conversion costs for each modification.  
Table 11.   UH-1Y to HH-1Y Conversion Costs 
UH-1 to HH-1 
Modifications Actions Required 
 Conversion Cost Per 
Aircraft (FY2014 $) 
 Total 
Conversion 
Cost for 6 
Aircraft 
(FY2014 $) 
  R&D, Engineering/Logistics $426,000  $426,000  
Lighting Retrofit $125,373  $752,238  
  Total Lighting   $1,178,238  
Coupled Hover 
R&D $52,478,500  $52,478,500 
Retrofit $2,038,000  $12,228,000  
Additional O&S $2,751,300  $16,507,800  




Quantity 2 $208,204  $416,408  
Total Estimate 
   $82,392,538  
  
 
Taken together, the total procurement estimate for the six HH-1Y helicopters is 
$258,098,280 or $43,016,380 per aircraft. Because the coupled hover capability was 
taken from a ROM that ranged from $73.2 million to 86.2 million (FY2014 dollars), this 
total could vary +/- $6.5 million or +/- $2.17 million per aircraft. Table 12 is the total cost 
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of procuring the HH-1Y (to include the conversion costs). The variability shown is based 
on the ROM for the coupled hover given by the program office.   
Table 12.   HH-1Y Total Procurement Cost Estimate 
Procurement Estimate  
(FY2014 $ thousands)  Lower-Bound Mid-Range Upper-Bound 
Total Modifications   $75,892.54 $82,392.54 $88,892.54 
Total SAR Procurement   $251,598.28  $258,098.28  $264,598.28  
Total per Aircraft   $41,933.05  $43,016.38  $44,099.71  
 
Assuming a 30-year life cycle for the HH-1Y, and applying straight line 
depreciation to these aircraft over that period, the estimated annual cost to be depreciated 
is $8,603,280 (FY2014 dollars) per year. Table 13 shows the estimated annual 
depreciation cost. 
Table 13.   Estimated Annual Depreciation Cost of HH-1Y Over 30-Year Life Cycle 
30-Year Life Cycle  
(FY2014 $ thousands)   Low Average High 
  
 
   
Estimated Annual 
Depreciation  Cost   $8,386.61  $8,603.28  $8,819.94  
 
4. Operations and Support Costs (O&S) 
O&S Cost data for the UH-1Y were obtained using the same method as the HH-
1N. Total O&S cost was severely skewed because of the growing inventory of UH-1Y 
from zero to 59 over the previous six years. To obtain an estimate that would better 
represent O&S costs, we broke down total O&S cost by flight hour for the UH-1Y, 
dividing total costs by total flight hours. We then separated cost per flight hour into five 
cost categories: continuing system improvements, sustainment and support, maintenance 
and support, unit level operations, and unit level manpower costs. Figure 16 provides an 
illustration of the cost per flight hour of the UH-1Y broken into these five categories. 
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Figure 16.  UH-1Y Cost per Flight Hour 
The chart depicts the sum of all historical UH-1Y O&S cost data available in 
VAMOSC. Because the UH-1Y is a relatively new aircraft and has not yet reached full 
operational capability (FOC), the data from FY2008 to FY2012 reflect significant 
variability, specifically in the first year (service inventory was one aircraft). Additionally, 
in subsequent years many aircraft underwent initial fielding. Because of the limited 
observations (only six fiscal years), and the year-to-year differences in aircraft number, 
which created large cost variances, we did not use UH-1Y data to forecast the HH-1Y’s 
O&S costs. Rather, we used the historical cost data associated with the HH-1N. 
The UH-1N program is a much more established Major Defense Acquisitions 
Program (MDAP). Additionally, an examination of the O&S cost data from FY2010 to 
FY2012, reveal that the CPH three-year moving averages for the HH-1N and UH-1Y 
were within 2.9%, at $8,817 and $8,562, respectively. Furthermore, there are 
overwhelming similarities between the two airframes, their cost and employment. 
Because of the greater amount of historical cost data available to reference and the shared 
commonality between the UH-1N and the UH-1Y, we used the O&S cost data for the 
HH-1N to project future HH-1Y O&S costs.  
Because of the significant similarities between the HH-1N and the UH-1Y, we 
















aircraft. In contrast, there are organizational dissimilarities which exist between the two 
SAR units operating the HH-46E and the HH-1N. However, our analysis assumes no 
change to direct maintenance manpower requirements at VMR-1 based on 
communication with manpower representatives (A. Lavato, personal communication, 
July 15, 2013). Additionally, SAR pilot billets are assumed to be unaffected by the 
transition to the HH-1Y.  
Using 10 years of historical O&S cost data from the UH-1N, we projected future 
costs by using Microsoft Excel and Oracle’s Crystal Ball plug-in to forecast O&S CPH 
for the UH-1Y. The Predictor function in Crystal Ball provided us a time-series forecast 
based on the historical O&S cost data. Although a cursory analysis may have forecasted 
using a simple O&S average, we assumed that the more recent years’ data may be more 
indicative of future costs. Thus, we used exponential smoothing as our model to forecast 
O&S costs for the HH-1Y over 10 years.  
Exponential smoothing exponentially decreases the weights of a weighted moving 
average and “constructs forecast of future values as weighted averages of past 
observations, with the more recent observations carrying more weight in determining 
forecasts than observations in the more distant past” (Fomby, 2008, p. 1). The method 
then uses standard forecasting accuracy measures like the mean squared errors (MSE), 
mean absolute deviation (MAD), and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) to 
measure accuracy of the forecast. The time series CPH data for the HH-1N clearly show a 
linear trend, increasing on average 6% per year over 10 years, and shows no discernible 
cyclic or seasonal activity. Because of these characteristics, we generated a forecast using 
double exponential smoothing, which assumes a trend but no seasonality. Double 
exponential smoothing uses two smoothing rates: a level smoothing rate, and a trend 
smoothing rate. The double exponential model equation is yt = μt + βtt+ at; where t is time 
or number of periods; β is the trend smoothing factor; and a is the level smoothing factor 
(Fomby, 2008, p.8). Predictor chooses smoothing factors that minimize error. Figure 17 
is a chart that depicts the forecasted O&S CPH, and table 14 contains the descriptive 
statistics associated with the O&S forecast cost model. 
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Figure 17.  Forecasted O&S Costs at 90% Confidence Interval 
 
Table 14.   Descriptive Statistics Associated With Forecast O&S Cost Model 
Descriptive Statistics 















Table 15 contains the forecasted O&S cost per flight hour for the UH-1Y with 
upper and lower confidence limits (90% and 10%). Both M-SHARP and VAMOSC 
reflected that each SAR unit flew approximately 1,000 hours annually. Thus, we assumed 
1,000 flight hours annually for each HH-1Y SAR unit per year. 
Table 15.   HH-1Y O&S Forecast Cost for 10 Years 





2013 $7,001 $8,693 $10,385 
2014 $7,229 $8,770 $10,310 
2015 $6,992 $8,846 $10,701 
2016 $6,917 $8,923 $10,929 
2017 $6,863 $8,999 $11,135 
2018 $5,884 $9,076 $12,268 
2019 $6,319 $9,153 $11,986 
2020 $5,985 $9,229 $12,474 
2021 $5,791 $9,306 $12,821 
2022  $9,382   
10 YR O&S @ 
1,000 flight hours 
per unit  
  $90,376,491   
10 YR O&S for 
Both SAR Units    $180,752,982   
 
5. HH-1Y 10-Year Cumulative Cost Estimates 
Ten-year cumulative cost estimates were calculated by adding 10 years of lower-
bound, mid-range, and upper-bound estimates for procurement, conversion and O&S 
costs. Procurement and conversion costs assumed a 30-year life cycle, straight line 
depreciation, and no salvage value; procurement and conversion costs were summed and 
then divided by 30 to derive annual depreciation. Table 16 shows the 10-year cost 
estimate for both Cherry Point and Yuma. 
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Table 16.   HH-1Y 10-Year Total Cost Estimate for SAR 
HH-1Y 10-Year Estimate for both Cherry Point and Yuma (FY2014 $) 
  Lower Bound Mid-Range Upper Bound 
Procurement $57,922,447  $58,568,580 $59,214,717  
Conversion $25,297,513  $27,464,180  $29,630,847  
O&S Forecast $130,025,259 $180,752,982 $230,867,885 
Total: Two Locations $213,245,219 $266,785,742 $319,713,448 
 
We assumed the aircraft and units at each location to have identical costs. 
Therefore, we calculated procurement and O&S costs for a single location by dividing the 
estimate for both locations in half. Conversion costs for a single location assumed a 
procurement of three HH-1Y helicopters vice six and were derived by subtracting out 
variable costs (retrofit, and additional O&S) only. R&D was a fixed cost. Therefore, it is 
not a relevant cost.  Table 17 shows the 10-year cost estimate for a single location. 
Table 17.   10 Year Cost Estimate for a Single Location   
HH-1Y 10-Year Estimate for a Single Location (FY2014$) 
  Lower Bound Mid-Range Upper Bound 
Procurement $28,961,223  $29,284,290  $29,607,358  
Conversion $20,382,840  $22,549,507  $24,716,174  
O&S Forecast $65,012,629 $90,376,491 $115,433,942 
Total: Single Location $114,356,693 $142,210,288 $169,757,474 
 
6. HH-1Y First-Year Cost Estimates 
First-year cost estimates were calculated using the same assumptions as the 10-
year estimates; however, we considered only the costs of the first year in order to provide 
a more standard comparison to alternative II. Table 18 shows the first year cost estimate 
for both locations, and table 19 shows first year cost estimates for a single location. 
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Table 18.   First-Year Cost Estimate for Both Cherry Point and Yuma 
HH-1Y First-Year Estimate (2014) Both Cherry Point and Yuma 
  Lower Bound Mid-Range Upper Bound 
Procurement $5,792,245  $5,856,858 $5,921,472  
Conversion $2,529,751  $2,746,418  $2,963,085  
O&S Forecast $13,833,481 $17,845,490 $21,857,500 
Total: Two Locations $22,155,477 $26,448,766 $30,742,056 
*Assumes FY2014 Procurement and FY2016 Fielding.  
 
Table 19.   First-Year Cost Estimate for a Single Location  
HH-1Y First-Year Estimate (2014) for a Single Location 
  Lower Bound Mid-Range Upper Bound 
Procurement $2,896,122  $2,928,429  $2,960,736  
Conversion $2,038,284  $2,254,951  $2,471,617  
O&S Forecast $6,916,740 $8,922,745  $10,928,750  
Total: Single Location $11,851,147 $14,106,125 $16,361,103 
*Assumes FY2014 Procurement and FY2016 Fielding.  
 
F. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT ALTERNATIVES 
Outsourcing SAR for one or both locations is another option considered in this 
analysis. This alternative involves the contracting of a commercial service provider to 
assume the SAR mission currently conducted by VMR-1 and SRU. To estimate a cost 
associated with this alternative, we examined existing contracts that involve a number 
helicopter services providers. Commercial solutions vary from more limited capability to 
advanced, high-end capability. An example of a low-end capability alternative is the 
Marine Corps air ambulance contract that services Twentynine Palms, CA. On the high 
end of the capability spectrum, we studied multi-helicopter regional SAR contracts, such 
as those that currently exist in the UK. 
Commercial helicopter service providers in the United States currently do not 
perform extensive SAR operations for government agencies or the general public that 
involve elevated risk. The U.S. Coast Guard and other federal and state agencies, such as 
the Border Patrol, U.S. Parks Service, as well as state and local law enforcement, have 
historically provided these services to most areas of the country. This has resulted in little 
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incentive for private industry to compete in this market. To estimate the cost of SAR, we 
consider a similar, but slightly less capable, market for helicopter service operations 
contracted by the U.S. military. Our analysis then compares these services to more 
capable SAR services that exist in other countries, such as the UK, Australia, and Ireland, 
where government agencies have outsourced this function to commercial service 
providers. By identifying the capabilities and costs associated with each, our analysis 
defines the borders that exist for this particular commercial helicopter service worldwide 
and provides an estimated price range for SAR in the United States.  
Due to the nature of the competitive global market for helicopter services, 
commercial vendors did not disclose detailed price data. The information is generally 
considered sensitive by companies due the need for each to protect their competitive 
advantage. Moreover, we were not provided any data for contracted flight hours, or fixed 
or variable costs. This limitation precluded a detailed analysis of CPH (similar to the UH-
1Y). Therefore, our analysis of this option focuses on data obtained from open source 
information provided in news releases and contained in periodicals, trade publications, 
and newspapers. Due to historically low demand for SAR, cost data in this alternative are 
based on coverage and capability versus flight hours. Therefore, we assume all costs 
associated with this alternative to be covered in a firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract; no 
additional incremental costs would be incurred outside of the FFP.  
Some greater details were available in U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 
contracts that provide helicopter services at several locations. However, due to the 
requirement differences of these contracts and the performance differences of the aircraft 
and crew, these services do not match exactly the demand for high-end SAR sought at 
Cherry Point and Yuma by the Marine Corps. Our analysis uses the limited helicopter 
service industry data available to provide a spectrum of costs and capabilities that are 
currently seen in the global market. This methodology allows us to bracket the 
outsourced cost of SAR based on DoD contract data and information that has been 
released to the public. Capability and performance information is then given to facilitate 
decision-making.   
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1. Center for Naval Analyses Estimates 
We first examined the commercial contract estimates provided in the 2003 CNA 
report “Alternatives for USMC’s Local Base SAR” (Pedrick & Keenan, 2003). Pedrick 
and Keenan (2003) obtained estimates for commercial contracts for SAR from Petroleum 
Helicopters Incorporated (PHi); however, details regarding the type of contract, fixed and 
variable costs, or specific capabilities (over-water, hoist, etc.) were absent. Furthermore, 
representatives at CNA were not available for discussion on these estimates.  
According to the Pedrick & Keenan, 2003 report, the estimated seven-year cost of 
a commercial SAR contract for three locations (Beaufort, Cherry Point, and Yuma) from 
FY2004 to FY2010 was $60.6 million (then-year [TY] 2003 dollars; p. 19). Assuming the 
cost of each location to be the same (dividing by 3), and also assuming costs to remain 
constant from year to year (dividing again by 7), and converting to FY2014 dollars (using 
the Joint Inflation Calculator from the NCCA), we estimate the average yearly contract 
cost per location to be $3.59 million (FY2014$). However, accounting for inflation, 
assuming year-to-year cost increases of 3.85% based on the inflation rate derived from 
the air ambulance contract at Twentynine Palms, we calculated the first-year cost 
estimate from the CNA report to be $3.03 million (FY2014$) and the final-year cost to be 
$3.95 million (FY2014$) for each location. 
These estimates assumed the use, operation, and maintenance of the Bell 412EP 
helicopter, one helicopter at each location (three locations plus one helicopter to be used 
as a maintenance back-up), and around-the-clock coverage seven days per week (Pedrick 
& Keenan, 2003, p. 18). We found these cost estimates to be comparable (however, at the 
low-end) of the current air ambulance contract at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
Center (MCAGCC) in Twentynine Palms, CA. 
2. Twentynine Palms Air Ambulance 
The contract for air ambulance services, at Twentynine Palms, CA, serves as an 
initial point of reference for our commercial cost analysis because it is currently the only 
helicopter services contract that exists in the Marine Corps. Although this contract does 
not provide all of the capabilities currently demanded by SAR squadrons at Cherry Point 
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and Yuma, the contract does provide cost information about the helicopter services 
industry capable of serving DoD needs. Due to the limited scope and capability of the 
contracted service, we estimate that it will provide a lower boundary for our cost analysis. 
(The contract does not require the commercial provider to conduct over-water or hoist 
rescues.) The Marine Corps air ambulance contract at Twentynine Palms is a five-year 
FFP contract. The contract was renewed in January 2012 and covers calendar year 2012 
through 2016. The purpose of the contact was to “obtain 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
air ambulance services … and limited amounts of other air transport services, for the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTFTC), Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center 
(MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, California” (Solicitation/Contract, 2012 p. 8). The cost 
of annual air ambulance services to the Marine Corps at Twentynine Palms is listed in 
Table 20. Our analysis calculated the inflation rate used over the contact period to be 
3.85%. The total cost over the five-year period is $18.9 million with an average annual 
cost of $3.8 million. Table 20 shows a cost breakdown of the air ambulance contract at 
MCAGCC in Twentynine Palms, CA. 
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Table 20.   Annual Twentynine Palms Air Ambulance Contract Service and Flight 
Hour Prices (after Solicitation/Contract, 2012) 
Service         Year  Quantity Unit Price   
                                                                      2012     
Base Period Air Ambulance Service:  12  $  245,248.34  
 Base Period Level IV Flight Hours: 
 
200  $      1,975.00  
                                                                       2013 
   Base Period Air Ambulance Service: 
 
12 $  254,691.34  
 Base Period Level IV Flight Hours: 
 
300  $      2,051.00  
                                                                       2014 
   Base Period Air Ambulance Service: 
 
12 $  264,497.93  
 Base Period Level IV Flight Hours: 
 
300  $      2,130.00  
                                                                       2015  
   Base Period Air Ambulance Service: 
 
12 $  274,682.11  
 Base Period Level IV Flight Hours: 
 
300  $      2,212.00  
                                                                       2016  
   Base Period Air Ambulance Service: 
 
12 $  285,258.43  
 Base Period Level IV Flight Hours: 
 
300  $      2,297.00  
  
Then-year dollar amounts contained in the contract were then normalized by 
converting contact amounts to FY2014 dollar amounts using the joint inflation calculator 
(JIC). This adjustment resulted in the following FY2014 dollar amounts listed in Table 21. 
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Table 21.   Twentynine Palms Air Ambulance Annual Contract Costs in FY2014$ 
 Service by Year 
(Base Period) Amount (CY) Weighted Index 
 







Air Ambulance Service:  $      2,942,980.08  
  
 $  2,944,489.30  
Level IV Flight Hours:  $         395,000.00  
  
 $     395,202.56  






Air Ambulance Service:  $      3,056,296.08  
  
 $  3,116,789.01  
Level IV Flight Hours:  $         615,300.00  
  
 $     627,478.56  






Air Ambulance Service:  $      3,173,975.18  
  
 $  3,298,296.46  
Level IV Flight Hours:  $         639,000.00  
  
 $     664,028.96  






Air Ambulance Service:  $      3,296,185.38  
  
 $  3,490,374.08  
Level IV Flight Hours:  $         663,600.00  
  
 $     702,694.77  






Air Ambulance Service:  $      3,423,101.13  
  
 $  3,693,637.42  
Level IV Flight Hours:  $         689,100.00  
  
 $     743,561.30  
        Total:  $      4,112,201.13       $  4,437,198.72  
 Total Cost 2012–2016:  $    18,894,537.85     $19,676,552.44  
  
   
  
 Average Annual Cost:  $      3,778,907.57     $  3,935,310.49  
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3. United Kingdom Search and Rescue 
On March 26, 2013, the United Kingdom announced that it had contracted with 
Bristow helicopters of Houston, TX, to conduct SAR at 10 locations using 22 aircraft. 
According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the “UK Department for Transportation (DFT) has 
signed a GBP 1.6 billion (USD 2.4 billion) contract with Bristow Helicopters Limited 
(BHL) to provide rotary-winged search and rescue (SAR) services for the next 10 years” 
(Jennings, 2013). The announcement marks the largest outsourcing of SAR by a 
government to date, and a landmark shift in how the UK government provides SAR 
services. According to The Telegraph, “The 10 year contract, launching in 2015, will end 
70 years of search and rescue provided by the RAF [Royal Air Force] and Royal Navy” 
(Ebrahimi, 2013).    
Exact dollar figures required to conduct an intense cost analysis were not 
available. However, our analysis extrapolates information from data sources that are then 
used to project an annual price estimate for each aircraft model. According to the Defense 
Industry Daily, the request for proposal (RFP) structure consists of two coverage zones. 
Each zone has specific aircraft performance requirements to meet the needs of a 
geographic region. The lot 1 area “minimum rescue capacity per aircraft is 8 
casualties/survivors (2 of which could be stretchered) and minimum radius of action is 
200 nm/370 km, and 250 nm / 463 km” (“Britain’s Next”, 2013, SAR-H The Solution, 
para. 1). The lot 2 area “minimum rescue capacity per aircraft is just 4 
casualties/survivors (2 of which could be stretchered), and minimum radius of action is 
just 170 nm / 315 km” (“Britain’s Next,” 2013, SAR-H The Solution, para. 2). 
The UK government estimated the total value range at GBP 2.0 billion–3.1 billion 
when constructing the request for proposal. The estimated value of the lot 1 RFP was 1.2 
billion–1.8 billion. The estimated value range for lot 2 was 800 million to 1.3 billion. 
(“Britain’s Helicopter,” 2013, para. 2, 3). These figures suggests that the UK government 
estimated lot 1 to account for between 58.1% and 60% of the total and lot 2 to account 
for between 40% and 41.9% of the total cost for the contract.  
Bristow bid £1.6 billion ($2.4 billion) to service both lot area 1 and lot area 2. The 
company intends to meet the requirements for lot 1 using the Sikorsky S-92 and the 
requirements for lot 2 by using the Agusta Westland AW189 aircraft. According to the 
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Bristow Group Inc. Analyst Day 2013 report, the preliminary cost of the S-92 is $35–$40 
million, and the preliminary cost of the AW189 is $20–$25 million. The aircraft cost 
figures from the company’s analyst day report indicate that the S-92 accounts for 61.5%–
63.6% of the aircraft purchase costs, and the AW189 accounts for 36.4%–38.5% of the 
aircraft purchase costs associated with the UK contract.  
Our analysis uses the UK government’s estimated lot 1 and lot 2 costs for SAR 
operations, as well as the reported preliminary purchase costs of each aircraft, to estimate 
the price of SAR provided by each aircraft. Using this method, we estimate that the 
operations of the S-92 aircraft account for between 58.1% and 63.6% of the total cost of 
the UK contract, and that the AW189 accounts for between 36.4%–41.9% of the total UK 
contract. Analysis of these figures yields the then-year dollar amounts in the Table 22. 
Table 22.   Estimated Average UK SAR Costs by Aircraft Type 
    £   TY$ 




   
  
AW189 
  36.4%  £   582,400,000.00  
 
 $   873,600,000.00  
  Annual Cost:  £     58,240,000.00  
 
 $     87,360,000.00  
  Annual Cost per Aircraft:  £       5,294,545.45 
 
 $       7,941,818.18  
  
   
  
  41.9% £   670,400,000.00  
 
 $ 1,005,600,000.00  
  Annual Cost:  £     67,040,000.00  
 
 $   100,560,000.00  
  Annual Cost per Aircraft:  £       6,094,545.45  
 
 $       9,141,818.18  
  
   
  
Average Annual Cost per Aircraft: £       5,694,545.45  
 
 $       8,541,818.18  
  
   
  
S-92 
  58.1%  £   929,600,000.00  
 
 $ 1,394,400,000.00  
  Annual Cost:  £     92,960,000.00  
 
 $   139,440,000.00  
  Annual Cost per Aircraft:  £       8,450,909.09  
 
 $     12,676,363.64  
  
   
  
  63.6% £ 1,017,600,000.00  
 
 $ 1,526,400,000.00  
  Annual Cost:  £   101,760,000.00  
 
 $   152,640,000.00  
  Annual Cost per Aircraft:  £       9,250,909.09  
 
 $     13,876,363.64  
  
   
  




To account for cost growth over the 10-year period of the contract, our analysis 
assumed a 3.85% inflation rate. This assumption was made based on the inflation rate 
obtained from the FFP contract awarded last year to provide air ambulance services to 
MAGTFTC at Twentynine Palms, CA. Our analysis used the inflation rate from the 
Marine Corps contact, the known total price and estimated costs by aircraft type 
previously discussed from the UK SAR contract to project the TY annual cost for each 
aircraft over the 10-year period.        
Then-year dollar amounts determined through our analysis were then normalized 
using the JIC and converted to FY2014 dollars. Using these figures, we estimate the first-
year cost of SAR for the AW189 to be between $5.9 million and $6.7 million with an 
average of $6.2 million. The same method provides a first year estimate of the S-92, with 
costs ranging between $9.3 million and $10.2 million and an average being $9.8 million. 
Table 23 provides the break down for the AW189 and S-92 aircraft along with the TY and 
FY2014 dollar amounts associated with the estimates derived from the UK SAR contract.     
Table 23.   Estimated UK SAR Estimated First-Year Cost (FY2014) 
                                                          % of Total Cost    Per Aircraft Cost 
AW189     2017 
  36.4% 
 
  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft TY: 
 
 $    6,433,893.72  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft (FY14): 
 




  41.9% 
 
  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft TY: 
 
 $    7,406,047.99  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft (FY14): 
 
 $    6,735,623.56  
   
  Average (FY14): 
 
 $    6,293,548.03  
S-92    2017 
  58.1% 
 
  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft TY: 
 
 $  10,269,484.21  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft (FY14): 
 




  63.6% 
 
  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft TY: 
 
 $  11,241,638.48  
  Estimated Cost per Aircraft (FY14): 
 




  Average (FY14):   $    9,781,925.86  
Note. First-year costs calculated assuming 3.85% rate of inflation over contract life. 
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G. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 24 provides some notable performance data and characteristics associated 
with each aircraft presented in our alternative analysis. The performance data and 
characteristics of these aircraft are presented here to enable a relative comparison among 
alternatives. The comparison ensures that as alternatives are considered, each potential 
replacement is a viable option and provides capabilities necessary for performing the 
current mission, while identifying slight variations in performance between aircraft that 
may necessitate a tradeoff. 
Table 24.   Aircraft Performance Characteristics 
 Bell 412EP HH-1Y AW189 S-92 
Useful Load 5,100 lbs. 6,661 lbs.   9,646 lbs. 10,000 lbs. 
Cabin Volume (cu.ft.) 220 220 395.5 700 
Cruise Speed (Kts) 132 kts  147 kts  150 kts  151 kts 
Mission Range 365 nm 310 nm 400 nm   476 nm 
Crew/Passengers 1/14 2/10 2/18 2/19 
 
To facilitate a comparison of alternatives, Figure 18 plots the costs associated 
with the recent commercial outsourcing alternatives analyzed in this thesis versus the 
capabilities of each alternative. Capability increases from left to right, beginning with the 
capabilities found in the Twentynine Palms air ambulance contract (Bell-412 helicopter) 
at the low end and extending to the more advanced UK SAR capability (S-92 helicopter) 
on the high end. Our basis for measuring capability is in terms of the SAR capability of 
the aircraft and crew only. Due to the recent demonstration of commercial SAR crews to 
complete complex and hazardous mission tasking, we assume the capability of the crew 
to be equal. Therefore, the separation between the HH-1Y and the commercial SAR 
alternatives is assumed to be aircraft performance. SAR performance was based on 
aircraft range, lift capability, and the number of passengers that can be transported. It 
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does not account for factors such as the ability to utilize the assets to accomplish alternate 
missions, such as range sweeps, logistics runs, and miscellaneous support. 
 
Figure 18.  Annual Cost vs. Capability and Performance of SAR Alternatives 
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Since 1998, local base SAR units at several air stations have been divested as a 
result of cost cutting measures. Significant budgetary constraints and an austere fiscal 
environment have again spurred interest among senior leaders to examine ways to 
achieve cost savings for the Marine Corps while preserving the readiness of our core 
competencies. Our thesis is based on a request from APP-51 to compare the cost of future  
USMC local base SAR options with commercial outsourcing  alternatives . Our analysis 
seeks to aid decision makers by providing an estimate of the  costs associated with these 
alternatives.  
Our primary research question asked whether a commercial contract could 
provide SAR service to MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma more cost effectively than 
continuing to maintain the local base SAR units at each location. To answer this question, 
we utilized the CBA methodology as provided in the OMB Circular A-94 Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (OMB, 1992). However, 
for the purpose of our analysis, we specifically examined only fiscal dollar costs and did 
not analyze or compare qualitative cost or benefits between alternatives. Additionally, we 
did not address SAR policy but sought only to provide an accurate analysis of current and 
projected costs and a comparison to a commercial SAR contract with like capabilities. 
To begin our research, we first analyzed SAR unit activity. Our data show that 
over the past five years, a very small percentage of overall SAR unit activity was the 
actual conduct of SAR (or similar missions like MEDEVAC or patient transfer). For 
instance, only 8% of total flight hours flown by VMR-1 directly supported SAR 
missions, while only 3% of total flight hours flown by SRU directly supported SAR. 
Furthermore, we found that Cherry Point SAR averaged just 33 SAR missions annually 
over the past five years, while Yuma SAR averaged only 13 SAR missions annually over 
the same time period. We also found that of these SAR missions, only a minority actually 
supported DoD personnel. In fact, the preponderance of missions flown by Marine SAR 
units (85% and 58% for Cherry Point and Yuma, respectively) were flown in support of 
organizations or persons external to the DoD.  
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We then estimated the future costs to the Marine Corps for continuing local base 
SAR at both Cherry Point and Yuma. Our estimate is based on 10 years of historical 
O&S cost data, in addition to the projected procurement and conversion costs associated 
with upgrading Marine Corps SAR aircraft. As a result, we estimate the Marine Corps 
will spend between $213 and $319 million (FY2014; 90% confidence interval) on local 
base SAR for both locations over the next 10 years, with the mid-range estimate being 
approximately $267 million. First-year costs, associated with the HH-1Y, are estimated 
between $22 and $30 million (FY2014; 90% confidence interval), with the mid-range 
estimate of approximately $26 million. The first-year cost estimate for a single location, 
at either Cherry Point or Yuma, ranges between approximately $12 and $16 million 
(FY2014; 90% confidence interval), with a mid-range estimate of $14 million.  
We then performed an analysis, based on existing DoD contracts and open-source 
information, of a commercial outsourcing alternative. In particular we examined the 
existing air ambulance contract at MCAGCC, estimates provided to CNA in their 2003 
report, and open-source reports of other governmental SAR contracts (particularly the 
U.K.) which have contacted for high-end SAR capability from commercial service 
providers. Analysis of these information sources revealed a range of capabilities; from 
basic air ambulance services serving MCAGCC, to advanced SAR capabilities provided 
by Bristow Group Inc. to the U.K. The cost estimate per location ranged between $3 and 
$10 million (FY2014). However, we determined that the capability of the air ambulance 
service would not meet or exceed the capability of existing local base SAR units. Cost 
estimates for commercial services that meet or exceed current SAR capability range from 
$6 million (based on use of the AW189) to $10 million (based on use of the S-92) 
(FY2014) per location. Of note, both of the cost estimates for a commercial SAR option 
(the AW189 and S-92) represent aircraft performance improvements over existing and 
future Marine Corps local base SAR.  
The option to use the AW189 represents the most similar comparison in our 
analysis to existing and future local base SAR capabilities. The estimated cost range for 
the AW189 to provide SAR is between $5.9 and $6.4 million, with a mid-range estimate 
of $6.15 million (FY2014) per location.  
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B. SUMMARY ON MAIN FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATION  
In order to meet the objective of our thesis, we first addressed our secondary 
research question which was to determine the estimated future costs of local base SAR 
units and estimated future costs associated with a contract for SAR service. Based on our 
analysis, we estimate the future costs of local base SAR to be approximately $26 million 
per year (FY14$) for both locations. We also estimate the future cost of commercial 
outsourcing for local base SAR to be approximately $12 million per year (FY14$) for 
both locations.  
We then answer our primary research question which was to determine if a 
commercial contract for SAR service would be a more cost-effective alternative than 
continuing to maintain local base SAR units. Based on our research, analysis, and 
assumptions we found the potential for significant cost savings with the commercial 
alternative.  The Marine Corps could realize savings of approximately $14 million per 
year (FY2014) by utilizing a commercial contract for local base SAR at MCAS Cherry 
Point and MCAS Yuma.  
As a result, we recommend the Marine Corps consider the use of commercial 
contracts for SAR at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Yuma, provided that further 
analysis does not obviate the findings in this thesis. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several areas recommended for further research that should be explored 
prior to a decision to change Marine Corps local base SAR. These areas could affect the 
feasibility of utilizing a commercial contract for SAR and could increase or decrease any 
proposed cost savings. 
1. Policy 
We recommend further study on SAR policies, including identification of Marine 
Corps SAR requirements, specifically capabilities and response times. This study will 
necessarily depend on changes to, or re-adoption of, portions of Marine Corps Order 
3130.2, Standard Operating Procedures for Marine Corps Air Station SAR Units and 
 69 
Helicopter Crewmember Evaluation and Training Program (HQMC, 1987), which was 
rescinded in February 2013.  
Additionally, we recommend further analysis on the impact of the loss of Marine 
Corps local base SAR to the National SAR Plan, and to the availability of air medical 
services in the local communities. Implied in this suggestion is the consideration of 
significant political factors that affect local base SAR units at both MCAS Cherry Point 
and MCAS Yuma. We also recommend further analysis of an alternative that would 
mandate the use (and/or repositioning) of adjacent governmental SAR assets (like the 
Coast Guard) to perform the SAR mission for the Marine Corps, versus utilizing local 
base SAR units or commercial contracts. 
2. Economics 
Our analysis assumed that there are no substantive differences in governmental 
regulation or policy between the U.S. and U.K. that would cause significant changes to 
our cost estimate. Furthermore, we assumed that the commercial vendor would not incur 
additional overhead expense that would require significant price adjustments, or that the 
commercial vendor uses variable costing vice absorption based costing methods in its 
accounting. Therefore we recommend that further study be conducted to determine the 
impact of governmental regulations and company accounting methods on industry 
pricing.        
3. Market 
While the commercial helicopter services industry has grown substantially over 
the last several decades, the SAR market in the U.S. has not evolved the way it has in 
other countries do to the extensive reliance on the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, use of 
commercial vendors for transport is restricted by DoDI 4500.53. Therefore, we 
recommend that further study be conducted to determine the nature of current market 
conditions for SAR in the U.S.    
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4. Facilities 
Our analysis assumed no new military construction and that existing spaces would 
be available for a contract SAR provider. However, any changes to this assumption could 
increase or decrease associated cost savings. Therefore, we recommend a facilities impact 
study be completed to determine the availability of existing hanger and office spaces, 
hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and fuel support for a commercial SAR contractor.  
5. Units and Manpower 
We also recommend further research into the unit and manpower impacts 
associated with changes to local base SAR; specifically, the impact of commercial 
outsourcing to C-9B maintenance at VMR-1. Divesture of the SAR capability at VMR-1 
could negatively impact the ability of the unit to perform maintenance on the C-9B due to 
significant cross-training within its maintenance department. A significant loss of T/O 
line numbers could have negative impacts on the unit’s ability to maintain the C-9B. 
However, utilization of a commercial contract to perform maintenance on the C-9B (the 
squadron’s UC-35 maintenance is already performed by contractors) could potentially 
alleviate this shortfall but may decrease the projected cost savings associated with 
divesture of local base SAR at Cherry Point.   
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APPENDIX A:  NAVAL HELICOPTER AND TILT ROTOR 
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY CAPTURED IN VISIBILITY AND 
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APPENDIX B:  COST ELEMENT STRUCTURE FOR SAR 
AIRCRAFT (BOTH HH-46E AND HH-1N) FROM VISIBILITY AND 
MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COSTS 
(VAMOSC) 
1.0 - Unit-Level Manpower 
1.1 - Operations Manpower 
1.2 - Unit-Level Maintenance Manpower 
1.3 - Other Unit-Level Manpower 
2.0 - Unit Operations 
2.1 - Operating Material 
2.1.1 - Energy (POL, Electricity) 
2.1.2 - Training Munitions and Expendable Stores 
2.1.3 - Other Operational Material 
2.2 - Support Services 
2.3 - Temporary Duty 
3.0 - Maintenance 
3.1 - Organizational Maintenance and Support 
3.1.1 - Organization-Level Consumables 
3.1.2 - Organization-Level Repair Parts 
3.1.3 - Organization-Level DLRs 
3.1.4 - Contract Maintenance Services 
3.1.5 - Other Unit Maintenance 
3.2 - Intermediate Maintenance 
3.2.1 - Intermediate Level Consumable Parts 
3.2.2 - Intermediate Level Repair Parts 
3.2.3 - Intermediate Level DLRs 
3.2.4 - Government Labor 
3.2.5 - Contractor Maintenance 
3.2.6 - Other Intermediate Maintenance 
3.3 - Depot Maintenance 
3.3.1 - Government Depot Repair 
3.3.2 - Contractor Depot Repair 
3.3.3 - Other Depot Maintenance 
4.0 - Sustaining Support 
4.1 - System Specific Training 
4.1.1 - System Specific Operator Training 
4.1.2 - System Specific Non-Operator Training 
4.2 - Support Equipment Replacement 
4.3 - Operating Equipment Replacement 
4.4 - Sustaining Engineering and Program Management 
4.5 - Other Sustaining Support 
5.0 - Continuing System Improvements 
5.1 - Hardware Modifications or Modernization 
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5.2 - Software Maintenance & Modifications 
5.2.1 - Correction of Deficiencies 
5.2.2 - Software Enhancements 
6.0 - Indirect Support 
6.1 - Installation Support 
6.2 - Personnel Support 
6.2.1 - Personnel Administration 
6.2.2 - Personnel Benefits 
6.2.3 - Medical Support 
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APPENDIX C:  VMR-1 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION 
Billet Description 
Pay 
Grade BMOS PMOS 
HEADQUARTERS 
   COMMANDING OFFICER O5 7506 0000 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER O4 7506 0000 
SERGEANT MAJOR E9 8999 8999 
CAREER PLANNER E5 4821 4821 
AVN SAFETY/STAND 
   DIR SAFETY/STAND O4 7551 0000 
AVN SAF OFF O3 7596 0000 
NATOPS OFF (C-9) O4 7551 0000 
NATOPS OFF (UC-35) O4 7554 0000 
NATOPS OFF (H-46) O3 7562 0000 
AVN OPERATIONS CLERK E4 7041 0000 
S-1 
   ADMIN OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
ADMIN OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
LEGAL OFF O3 7554 0000 
ADMIN CHIEF E8 O111 O111 
PERSONNEL CHIEF E4 O112 O111 
S-3 
   OPERATIONS OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
OPS OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
ASST OPS OFF O4 7562 7562 
ASST OPS OFFICER O4 7506 0000 
SCHED OFF O3 7562 7562 
AVN OPERATIONS CHIEF E7 7041 7041 
AVN OPERATIONS CLERK E4 7041 7041 
AVIATION OPERATIONS 
CLERK E3 7041 7041 
TRNG OFF O3 7562 7562 
TRNG OFF O3 7562 7562 
TRNG CHIEF E6 6276 6276 
C-9 BRANCH 
   FLIGHT OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
FLIGHT OFFICER O4 7551 0000 
PILOT O5 7551 0000 
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PILOT O5 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7551 0000 
PILOT O4 7551 0000 
PILOT O4 7551 0000 
PILOT O3 7551 0000 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E4 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E4 6276 6276 
FLIGHT ATTENDANT E5 8014 0000 
FLIGHT ATTENDANT E5 8014 0000 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
UC-35 BRANCH 
   FLIGHT OFFICER O4 7554 0000 
FLIGHT OFFICER O4 7554 0000 
PILOT O5 7506 0000 
PILOT O5 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
PILOT O4 7506 0000 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
SAR BRANCH 
   SAR OIC O4 7562 7562 
SAR OIC O4 7562 7562 
PILOT O3 7562 7562 
PILOT O4 7562 7562 
PILOT O3 7562 7562 
PILOT O3 7562 7562 
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PILOT O3 7562 7562 
PILOT O3 7562 7562 
PILOT O3 7562 7562 
PILOT O4 7562 7562 
PILOT O4 7562 7562 
PILOT O4 7562 7562 
PILOT O4 7562 7562 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
SAR SWIMMER E4 6172 6172 
SAR SWIMMER E4 6172 6172 
SAR SWIMMER E4 6172 6172 
SAR SWIMMER E3 6172 6172 
SAR SWIMMER E3 6172 6172 
SAR TECH E5 8401 8406 
SAR TECH E4 8401 8406 
SAR TECH E4 8401 8406 
SAR TECH E4 8401 8406 
AIRCRAFT MAINT DIVISION 
   A/C MAINT OFFICER O4 7554 0000 
ASST ACFT MAINT OFF O3 6002 6002 
ACFT MAINT CHIEF E8 6019 6019 
NALC ADMIN/ANALYST E6 6049 6046 
MAINT ADMIN SPEC E5 6046 6046 
MAINT/MAT CONT BRANCH 
   M/M CONT CHIEF E7 6112 6112 
M/M CONT - AIRFRAMES E5 6256 6256 
M/M CONT - MECH E5 6216 6216 
M/M CONT - MECH E5 6112 6112 
M/M CONT - AVION E5 6322 6322 
IMRL 
   IMRL MANAGER E4 6042 6042 
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TOOL ROOM 
   QUALITY ASSURANCE 
BRANCH 
   Q/A OFFICER O3 7506 0000 
NCOIC E6 6216 6216 
Q/A - AIRFRAMES E7 6152 6152 
Q/A - AVION E6 6322 6322 
Q/A - AVION E6 6316 6316 
MAINT ADMIN SPEC - Q/A 
E4 6046 6046 
AIRCRAFT 
   A/C OFFICER O3 7562 7562 
AIRFRAMES 
   AIRFRAMES CHIEF E7 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH/HAZMAT E6 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH E5 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH E5 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH E3 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH E3 6152 6152 
AIRFRAMES MECH E5 6256 6256 
AIRFRAMES MECH E4 6256 6256 
AIRFRAMES MECH E4 6256 6256 
AIRFRAMES MECH E3 6256 6256 
CORROSION CONTROL 
   SNCOIC E6 6256 6256 
C/C MECH E4 6152 6152 
C/C MECH E3 6152 6152 
C/C MECH E3 6322 6322 
SAF/SURV EQUIP 
   SNCOIC E7 6048 6048 
FLT EQUIP MECH E4 6048 6048 
SAF EQUIP MECH E7 6286 6286 
SAF EQUIP MECH E3 6286 6286 
SAF EQUIP MECH E3 6286 6286 
AVIONICS BRANCH 
   AVIONICS OFFICER O3 7562 7562 
AVIONICS CHIEF E7 6322 6322 
AVION TECH E5 6322 6322 
AVION TECH E4 6322 6322 
AVION TECH E3 6322 6322 
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AVION TECH E5 6316 6316 
AVION TECH E3 6316 6316 
ELECT E5 6336 6336 
ELECT E5 6336 6336 
ELECT E4 6336 6336 
FLIGHT LINE BRANCH 
   FLIGHT LINE OFFICER O3 7562 7562 
LINE CHIEF E6 6216 6216 
C-9 SECTION 
   LINE MECH E5 6216 6216 
LINE MECH E3 6216 6216 
LINE MECH E3 6216 6216 
LINE MECH E3 6216 6216 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E5 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E4 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
CREW MASTER E3 6276 6276 
UC-35 SECTION             CONTRACT 
MAINT 
  HH-46 SECTION 
   SNCOIC E6 6112 6112 
LINE MECH E5 6112 6112 
LINE MECH E3 6112 6112 
LINE MECH E3 6112 6112 
LINE MECH E3 6112 6112 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E5 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
CREW CHIEF E4 6172 6172 
GSE SECTION 
   SNCOIC E7 6072 6072 
GSE MECH E4 6072 6072 
GSE MECH E3 6072 6072 
IMA BRANCH 
   OIC O3 7506 0000 
PROD CONT 
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SNCOIC E7 6414 6414 
MAINT ADMIN SPEC - P/C 
E3 6046 6046 
MAINTENANCE SECTION 
   STR MECH/NDI E5 6092 6092 
COMM TECH E4 6414 6414 
NAV TECH E4 6414 6414 
ELECT/INST TECH E5 6433 6433 
GSE MECH E7 6073 6073 
GSE MECH E5 6073 6073 
GSE MECH E4 6073 6073 
CRYO EQUIP OPERATOR E5 6074 6074 
CRYO EQUIP OPERATOR E4 6074 6074 
SUPPLY/S-4 DIVISION 
   SUPPLY OFFICER W2 6604 6604 
AVN SUPPLY CHIEF E7 6672 6672 
AVN FISCAL ACCT CHIEF E6 6672 6672 
AVN FISCAL ACCT SPEC E4 6672 6672 
SQUADRON SUPPORT CHIEF E5 6672 6672 
AVN REQ/EXPIDITER SPEC E4 6672 6672 
CUSTODY RECORDS CLERK E3 3043 3043 
AVN SUPPLY EXPEDITER E3 6672 6672 
AVN RPR MGNT UNIT SPEC 
E3 6672 6672 





APPENDIX D:  YUMA SRU TABLE OF ORGANIZATION 
Billet Description 
Pay 
Grade BMOS PMOS NOTES 
UH-1 HUEY STANDARDS OFFICER O3 7563 7563 
HQ 
SAFETY 
SEARCH AND RESCUE TECHNICIAN HM2 8401 8406 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE TECHNICIAN HM3 8401 8406 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE TECHNICIAN HM3 8401 8406 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE TECHNICIAN HM3 8401 8406 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE OFFICER IN 
CHARGE O4 7563 7563 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSISTANT 
OFFICER IN CHARGE O4 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E5 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E5 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E5 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E5 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E4 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E4 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E4 6174 6174 SAR DET 
CREW CHIEF E4 6174 6174 SAR DET 
SEARCH AND RESCUE PILOT O3 7563 7563 SAR DET 
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER O3 7506 0000 SAR DET 
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CHIEF E8 6019 6019 SAR DET 
MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SPECIALIST E4 6046 6046 SAR DET 
HELOCOPTER MECHANIC E7 6114 6114 SAR DET 
INDIVIDUAL MAINTENANCE 
READINESS LIST MANAGER E3 6042 6042 SAR DET 
NCOIC E6 8014 0000 SAR DET 
TOOL ROOM ATTENDANT E3 8014 0000 SAR DET 
QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) OFFICER O3 7506 0000 SAR DET 
QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) CHIEF E7 6114 6114 SAR DET 
QUAILTY ASSURANCE (QA) AVIATION E6 6154 6154 SAR DET 
QUAILTY ASSURANCE (QA) AVIATION E6 6324 6324 SAR DET 
MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATIVE E3 6046 6046 SAR DET 
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SPECIALIST - Q/A 
NAVAL AVAITION LOG CMD INFO SYS 
(NALCOMIS) SPEC 
E5 6046 6046 SAR DET 
AIRFRAMES CHIEF E6 6154 6154 SAR DET 
AIRFRAMES MECHANIC E5 6154 6154 SAR DET 
AIRFRAMES MECHANIC E3 6154 6154 SAR DET 
AIRFRAMES MECHANIC E3 6154 6154 SAR DET 
HELICOPTER AIRFRAME MECHANIC 
A/UH-1 E6 6154 6154 SAR DET 
HELICOPTER MECHANIC U/AH-1 E3 6114 6114 SAR DET 
AIRCRAFT SAFETY MECHANIC E5 6048 6048 SAR DET 
AIRCRAFT SAFETY MECHANIC E3 6048 6048 SAR DET 
AVIONICS CHIEF E7 6324 6324 SAR DET 
AVIONICS TECHNICIAN E3 6324 6324 SAR DET 
AVIONICS TECHNICIAN E3 6324 6324 SAR DET 
AVIONICS TECHNICIAN E3 6324 6324 SAR DET 





APPENDIX E: SAR TOTAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS CODES 
TMR Code Description 
2P1 SUPT SAR/WATER MIL SUPT 
2P2 SUPT SAR/LAND MIL SUPT 
2P3 SUPT SAR/WATER N-DOD 
2P4 SUPT SAR/LAND N-DOD 
2P5 SUPT SAR/MEDEVAC MIL SUPT 
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